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I General Introduction 
This dissertation aims to propose a new procedure for benchmarking market efficiency and 
apply the proposed method to markets in China and the European Union (EU). It contains one 
article reviewing the literature testing the Law of One Price (LOP) and three articles dealing 
with quantitative analyses of estimating and comparing market efficiency frontiers. This 
research contributes to an extensive strand of market integration and efficiency literature that 
analyzes how prices are passed on and how the market is integrated between spatially 
separated markets, either interregionally, i.e., between markets within a country, or 
internationally, i.e., between markets of different countries. Moreover, it combines the 
cointegration analysis with frontier estimation methods.  
1 Problem statement and research questions 
The Law of One Price (LOP) maintains                     p  fi -seeking traders will lead to a 
long-run equilibrium whereby price   ff                                    osts of spatial 
arbitrage (von Cramon-Taubadel and Goodwin, 2021). An enormous literature has tested the 
LOP using different models (such as causality tests (Richardson, 1978); parity bound models 
(Sexton et al., 1991); cointegration methods (Asche et al., 1999, 2004)) to investigate the 
long-run equilibrium relationship between prices at spatially separated markets. 
Cointegration methods (precisely error correction models, ECMs) make it possible to 
simultaneously analyze both the long-run equilibrium relationship between prices at different 
locations and the error correction mechanism that restores this equilibrium relationship 
whenever it is disturbed by shocks. Previous literature employs increasingly sophisticated 
forms of ECMs (von Cramon-Taubadel, 1998; Abdulai, 2000; Goodwin and Piggott, 2001; 
Gonzalo and Pitarakis, 2006; Brümmer et al., 2009; Guney et al. 2019; Vollmer et al. 2020). 
Researchers who test the LOP or employ cointegration methods put efforts to conclude 
market integration and efficiency. However, conclusions are often drawn based on a static 
concept of market efficiency – given a set of demand and supply conditions on two (or more) 
spatially separated markets, and trade costs between them, they are either in equilibrium and 
therefore efficient, or not. 
However, market efficiency has two additional dynamic dimensions. First, trade costs vary 
over time and space due to technology (Goodwin et al., 2002), infrastructure (Zant, 2018; 




time, trade and prices cannot adjust instantaneously to shocks that disturb equilibrium 
(Ravallion, 1986). Both of these dimensions of efficiency draw attention to the fact that 
market efficiency is a relative concept.  
Even if tests enable us to conclude that two markets are in spatial equilibrium and therefore 
efficient in a static sense, it is only by comparing them with other pairs of markets that we can 
determine whether there is scope for increasing efficiency by lowering trade costs and/or 
increasing the speeds at which price signals are transmitted between them. Hence, to assess 
the efficiency of a pair of markets we need benchmarks derived from the observation and 
analysis of other pairs of markets.  
Several studies (Kouyaté et al. 2016; Kouyaté and von Cramon-Taubadel; 2016; Svanidze and 
Götz, 2019a, 2019b) have employed a two-step procedure to measure and benchmark market 
efficiency. In the first step, measures of the strength or speed of price transmission are 
estimated using the cointegration methods. In the second step, standard regression analysis 
with these estimates as dependent variables is used to explain variations in the estimated 
strength or speed of price transmission. However, they are based on standard regression 
techniques that focus on explaining variation around mean measures of price transmission. 
Few studies mentioned above account for the fact that the first-step measures of price 
transmission are estimated more precisely than others and should therefore have a 
correspondingly greater influence on the results of the second-step of the procedure. Only 
Svanidze and Götz (2019a) employ bootstrapping techniques to address this issue. 
Therefore, at the core of this dissertation, is a newly proposed method for benchmarking 
dynamic market efficiency to identify the strongest and most rapid examples of price 
transmission and applications. The main innovation is that the combination of cointegration 
analysis and stochastic frontier models. Frontier estimation light up this research at least in 
two aspects. First, the frontier analysis identifies the strongest and most rapid examples of 
price transmission that can be attained in a given setting and attempts to explain why price 
transmission between markets is sometimes closer to or farther from this benchmark. Second, 
stochastic frontier methods provide a straightforward and intuitively appealing means of 
accounting for the fact that the measures of price transmission generated from conventional 




China and the European Union (EU) are well-suited to illustrate the strengths and weaknesses 
of the proposed benchmarking approach and are considered economically relevant for several 
reasons:  
China and the EU have been essential players on pork markets around the globe. Since 2013, 
the EU-28 has been the biggest pork exporter, with pig meat exports reaching 7.74 million 
tonnes accounting for 67% of global pig meat exports (ITC, 2021). While China is the biggest 
pork importer, with pig meat imports amounting to 7.74 million tonnes accounting for 67% of 
global pig meat imports (ITC, 2021). China is the largest pig producer, followed by the EU, at 
a distance, by the USA. Pigs account for the largest livestock population in both China and 
the EU. In 2017, the overall pig meat production amounted to 23 million tonnes from around 
255 million slaughtered pigs in the EU-28 (Eurostat, 2021). And the overall production was 
55 million tonnes produced from approximately 702 million slaughtered pigs in China (The 
Ministry of Agriculture of China, 2018).  
Pigs and pork are traded across regions by various distances in China or the EU. Trade costs 
vary between markets due to geographic distance, road and rail infrastructure, etc. The 
international markets in different hog-producing member states of the EU are with an average 
distance of 1610 km (up to 5100 km), while interprovincial markets within the hog-producing 
provinces of China are with a relatively large average distance of 1890 km (up to 4400 km). 
The advantage of the large geographic size of China and the EU makes it appealing to build 
samples with hundreds of observations, which is vital for benchmarking market efficiency 
which requires comparing market pairs across space.  
The structures of the pig industry in both China and the EU are particular and have changed at 
an unprecedented speed especially in recent years. The pork production system in China is 
still extensive with different densities of raised pigs (Gilbert, M. et al., 2015) from various 
sized farms (such as large commercial, medium-sized specialized) and small backyards (Tian 
and von Cramon-Taubadel, 2020). Moreover, the Chinese pig industry is not highly vertically 
integrated (Zhang et al., 2019), while the pig industry in the EU is more vertically integrated 
(G        M          2015)   T                                                       fl          
Chinese hog markets from the EU in terms of the degree to which price and price shocks are 
spatially transmitted. 
In addition, the pig sector is fragile and distressingly affected by major veterinary crises, 




interventions such as border controls, trade bans, and animal welfare regulations during pig 
transportation are very likely to have triggered an impact on pig markets as well. Pig markets 
have been intervened less than other livestock markets in the EU (Serra et al., 2006). Market 
orientations by the Chinese government are often, for example, the state has restructured pork 
production toward large-scale tightening environmental regulations (Gilbert, M. et al., 2015) 
and has also implemented direct pork purchase, stocks release designed to stabilize the market 
(Dong et al., 2019).  
Pork is a major part of meat consumption of daily diet nutrition intake. Emphasizing to 
increase pork production of China and the EU meets increasing nutrition demands and 
contributes to global food security. That postulates spatially efficient regional markets 
increasing gains from trade (e.g., increase trade volumes, lower trade costs) and restoring to 
spatial equilibrium more rapidly whenever there is a shock.  
Other differences such as climate and weather differences, national dietary and cultural 
context, market information flows (futures market) motivate for investigating and comparing 
market integration and market efficiency across member states in the EU and provinces in 
China.  
During the recent two decades, the changes experienced by the pig sector and the large data 
set coupled with the modern developed methodological strategies make it novel to extend 
market efficiency analysis in a dynamic sense and build the potential market efficiency 
benchmarks for both Chinese and the EU hog markets. 
2 Overview of the dissertation 
Chapter II reviews the literature which has been developed for testing the LOP. Then three 
articles from Chapter III to V benchmark market efficiency.  
Literature Review on the Law of One Price 
This chapter reviews the theoretical and empirical framework for the test of the LOP between 
spatially separated locations. The conceptual issues are presented first, then empirical tests 
and evidence from the LOP literature are reviewed, general considerations and conclusions 
are presented at the end. 
Most studies essentially aim at verifying whether the LOP holds (often the strong form with 




econometric techniques. However, empirical result interpretation remains elusive, either with 
different conclusions after estimating different models based on the same dataset, or with 
different interpretations of results under the same testing procedures.  
In the case of agricultural commodity markets, deviations from the strong form of the LOP 
                        p      ‗        ‘:    de costs and trade delays. Rather than focusing on 
the simple acceptance or rejection of the LOP, it is more fruitful to compare actual adherence 
to the LOP with benchmarks. The idea of benchmark the LOP is proposed in this article based 
on spatial equilibrium conditions     G      ‘  (1975)       
Estimating dynamic market efficiency frontiers 
Previous studies of price transmission for agricultural commodities more or less draw 
conclusions based on a static concept of efficiency. Market efficiency, however, also has two 
additional dynamic dimensions: the magnitude of the gains from trade that can be realized in 
equilibrium and the speed with which equilibrium and thus efficiency is restored following 
shocks. 
A benchmarking procedure is proposed in this article. Rather than using standard regression 
techniques to explain variation in estimated measures of the strength and speed of price 
transmission, stochastic frontiers are estimated: first, estimating a stochastic frontier 
establishes a within-sample benchmark for market efficiency against which performance can 
be measured; Second, stochastic frontier methods offer a convenient way of accounting for 
the fact that the measures of price transmission generated in the first step of the benchmarking 
procedure are estimates. 
The proposed method is illustrated first using monthly data on pork prices on 30 provincial 
markets in China from 2000 to 2017. In the first step standard, ECM methods are used to 
estimate elasticities of price transmission (magnitude of market efficiency) as well as 
adjustment parameters that measure the speed of transmission (speed of restoring market 
efficiency) between individual markets. In the second step dynamic of market efficiency 
(magnitude and speed of restoring market efficiency) are benchmarked using stochastic 






Comparing market efficiency frontiers 
To supplement the previous article and to further explore the strengths and limitations of the 
proposed method in the first empirical article, the work is extended to a different agricultural 
commodity during the same period in two different economic systems.  
For this article, monthly hog prices of 30 provinces in China (yuan/kg) and 23 member states 
in the EU (Euro/kg) between July 2004 and December 2017 are employed to benchmark the 
magnitude of market efficiency at interprovincial level and international level separately. So 
in the first step following the previous article, price transmission elasticities are estimated 
using empirical models based on the nature of price series (stationary or nonstationary), in the 
second step, stochastic frontier models are estimated for the magnitude of market efficiency.   
The stochastic frontier of the estimated elasticity of price transmission defines for any given 
provincial or member-state distance the maximum magnitude of market efficiency and thus 
the minimum of trade costs that can be attained in China or the EU. In addition, 
interprovincial (China) or international (the EU) border dummy is included to examine the 
border effects (such as trade impediment). This method is appealing in this article not only 
because it enables us to compare specific market-pair deviations from the frontier within 
China or the EU after accounting for the measurement errors of first-step estimates, but also it 
provides two straightforward benchmarks, one for China and one for the EU. 
Measuring time-varying market efficiency 
In this article, spatial price transmission and market efficiency in the Chinese provincial pork 
markets are illustrated based on the time-varying vector error correction model (VECM).  
The previous two chapters assume that the elasticities and adjustment parameters that have 
been constant over the study period and are based on time-invariant estimation methods that 
do not take into account whether the trade infrastructure, shocks, and other sources of non-
constant parameters may affect markets in the price transmission process which changes over 
time. 
In this article, a further application is designed to generate time-varying speeds of adjustment 
of price transmission using VECM in state-space form (Adämmer and Bohl, 2015, 2018) for 
each pork market pair of China. Frontier techniques for different periods then are applied to 
study how the market efficiency frontier has shifted over time. The time-varying price 




commodity price discovery context (e.g. Vollmer et al., 2020). We propose to explore 
whether it can also be used to generate insights and extend the literature in our market 
efficiency benchmark applications.  
Chapters III to V form the core of this thesis. Results are summarized and conclusions are 




II Literature Review on the Law of One Price 
 
Author: Yali Mu 
 “The more nearly perfect a market is, the stronger is the tendency for the same price to be 
paid for the same thing at the same time in all parts of the market: but of course if the market 
is large, allowance must be made for the expense of delivering the goods to different 
purchasers; each of whom must be supposed to pay in addition to the market price a special 
charge on account of delivery.” (Marshall, 1890, p. 325) 
1 Introduction  
Following Fackler and Goodwin (2001, p. 978), the strong version of the LOP states that 
when a trade occurs, the price in the importing location equals the price in the exporting 
location plus trade costs (e.g. an obvious component, transport costs), which is exactly the 
perfect commodity arbitrage condition (Isard, 1977; Smith, 1988; Dawson and Dey, 2002), 
the presumption being that trade is continuous.
 1  
In the weak version of the LOP, price 
differences are no smaller than trade costs: when spatial arbitrage condition holds, the prices 
have a proportional relationship, price levels differ due to factors such as transport costs, 
quality differences (Asche et al., 1999) and other factors relevant to the overall costs of trade 
between spatially separated markets (von Cramon-Tabaudel and Goodwin, 2021).  
It is well confessed that, though expressing this concept which reflects the glut conviction in 
its adherence (Fackler and Goodwin, 2001), its assumptions prove to be quite restrictive. It is 
only expected to adjust spatial price relations in a frictionless undistorted world (Conforti, 
2004), but unlikely to hold in practice. Some factors such as distance, border, policies, market 
power, and imperfect flows of information that prevent prices on spatially separated markets 
from convergence. In the case of commodity markets, deviations from the strong form of the 
LOP                         p      ‗        ‘:       costs and trade delays. Trade costs also 
vary over time and space due to changes or differences in many factors. Moreover, since 
moving commodities between markets take time, trade cannot adjust instantaneously to 
shocks that disturb equilibrium (Ravallion, 1986).  
                                                             
1 There are some different versions of the LOP according to different literature. In this dissertation, the strong and weak 
version of the LOP are defined by following Fackler and Goodwin (2001, p. 978). 
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The testing work of the LOP by using causality (static or dynamic or both), cointegration 
models, and switch regime models has been very appealing for decades. It is the strong form 
of the LOP with continuous trade that is often tested by taking the LOP as an example of a 
steady-state relationship of prices which is proportional in the long run. The underlying 
hypotheses being tested are the same. The differences are the empirical techniques employed 
to measure and test.  
Despite all the different empirical methods developed to test the LOP, empirical evidence is 
mixed. Some studies claim that commodity prices reflect the LOP while others find 
significant deviations. Most find violations of the LOP and conclude that it does not hold. 
And all the studies suffer from the limitation of available data such as high frequent trade 
costs and trade flows. Even if tests enable us to draw conclusions that the LOP holds or fails 
for some market pairs, it is only by comparing with other market pairs we could determine if 
the adherence extent to the LOP could be improved. Hence, we need to move one step more, 
to assess the benchmark which is the largest adherence to the LOP derived from comparable 
observations. 
This chapter aims to provide a theoretical framework overview of price relationships between 
spatially separated markets to understand the development of empirical methods in the 
existing LOP study, and to assess the innovations in this research. The conceptual issues are 
given in section 2. Sections 3 and 4 review the methodology in empirical tests and evidence 
found from the tests for the LOP. In section 5, additional concerns about transport costs and 
trade flows are described. Section 6 concludes. 
2 Concepts 
2.1 Price Relationships in Spatial Markets 
Economists often use prices to define markets (Vinuya, 2007). Trade links spatially separated 
markets. This linkage is held by the underlying economic mechanism — arbitrage condition. 
If price differences surpass arbitrage costs, rational middlemen would take advantage of this 
opportunity and take actions to remove redundant p       ff        by trading the commodity 
from markets where commodity prices are low to a market where commodity prices are 
relatively high. Arbitrage condition involved in empirical evaluations of price relationship is 
often expressed as follows, 
   
    
                                                                      (1) 
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The price difference between   and   at time   should be at most the trade costs     at the 
same time (von Cramon-Taubadel and Goodwin, 2021).
 1  Where   
  and   
  represent a 
homogeneous commodity price in market   and   at any given time  , and     represents the 
expense of trading the commodity (e.g. transporting, packing, loading, and offloading).  
Note the terminology trade costs. In this dissertation, trade costs are used to refer to all the 
costs besides the costs of traded commodities themselves, that are involved in moving that 
commodity from one market to another for sale. Physical transport costs are part of the total 
trade costs, other costs associated with hedging, contracting (Barrett, 2001), loading and 
unloading (von Cramon-Taubadel and Goodwin, 2021), and administrative issues are also 
incurred during commodity trade conducted between spatially separated markets. Transaction 
costs or transfer costs are also used in some other literature, they all include transport costs, 
but many other types of costs as well. 











Source: Own expression based on von Cramon-Taubadel‟s (2019) lecture notes. 
                                                             
1  Arbitrage conditions implied by delivery lags that extend beyond a single time would be modified to 
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Figure 1 illustrates the concept of the LOP and dynamic market integration of a homogeneous 
commodity between spatially separated markets   and  . One of the markets has a lower 
arbitrage price (market  ), the other market has a higher arbitrage price (market  ). We get a 
trade price (      ) in trade equilibrium condition, in this case, we are ignoring trade costs 
prices are the same everywhere. In reality, we consider some trade costs, we have a certain 
price in market   (  ∗) and the price in market   (  ∗) is lower by the trade costs (   ). This 
         p                     pp                 B      ‘  (2001). There is a certain volume 
of trade going on between   and   and they are in spatial equilibrium. 
Generally, this also holds for a set of   markets among which trade occurs at fixed transport 
cost under spatial competitive equilibrium. If the trade takes place, such equilibrium holds for 
any two markets under the set with   markets which are spatially integrated.  
2.2 Relationships between spatial arbitrage, market integration, and the LOP 
As shown in equation (1), the spatial arbitrage condition expresses that the price differences 
of a homogeneous commodity in different markets will differ by no more than the cost of 
trading the commodity between markets (   ). It is an equilibrium concept (Fackler and 
Goodwin, 2001) and is expected to hold approximately, deviations from it should be the 
nature of transitory (e.g. delays in transport).  
The LOP follows from the spatial arbitrage condition directly. As discussed in section 2.1in 
this chapter, the weak version of the LOP is exactly the arbitrage condition, while the strong 
version is equation (1) taken with an equality sign (the presumption being that trade is 
continuous).  
As Barrett (2001) points out, economists typically define market integration in terms of the 
LOP; if the LOP holds between two markets, then they are integrated, and vice versa. As 
explicitly clarified by Barrett and Li (2002, p.292), market integration only reflects the 
tradability of commodities, regardless of the absence or presence of spatial market 
equilibrium and efficiency. Or say, market integration is an indicator of trade with volume 
(Thompson et al., 2002). 
To indicate the degree of price co-movements and the extent to which shocks are transmitted 
among spatially separated markets, Fackler and Goodwin (2001, p.978) give the following 
item: 
Literature Review on the Law of One Price 
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                                                            (2) 
   is a shock on  , and     is the ratio of price transmission between market   and market  . 
Two markets are perfectly integrated if      . The fundamental idea is that if shocks of 
prices are transmitted, then trade exits, and   and   are integrated. But this indicator still 
relies on price data only, while market integration could be assessed sufficiently only if trade 
data are accessible (Barrett and Li, 2002). 
As also explained by Barrett and Li (2002), efficiency is an indicator based on price, such as 
the LOP which is a static equilibrium concept. Market efficiency also has two important 
dynamic dimensions, one is the magnitude of trade costs and the other refers to the speed with 
which equilibrium and thus efficiency is restored following shocks. If we consider market 
efficiency to be synonymous with equilibrium (Barrett, 2001), according to Barrett and Li 
(2002), there are four combinations of integration and equilibrium that can hold between two 
markets.
 
Of these, perfect integration and segmented equilibrium are efficient with no 
unrealized potential Pareto improvements, while imperfect integration and segmented 
disequilibrium are not efficient with potential Pareto improvements.  
The following hierarchy holds for the conceptual issues defined in this section (Fackler and 
Goodwin, 2001, p.979): 
Perfect market integration ⇒ Strong Version LOP ⇒ Weak Version LOP 
3 Empirical tests for the LOP  
Most studies utilize time series econometric techniques that test for the LOP. The developed 
techniques include causality tests in static or dynamic, cointegration models (often regarded 
as the standard tool for analyzing spatial market relationships), and switching regime models 
that incorporate data on prices, trade costs, and trade volumes: 
 Causality tests (static and dynamic); 
 Cointegration analysis; 
 Parity bounds model. 
Collectively, these techniques offer a framework for assessing if changes in one price are 
transmitted to the other price completely and instantaneously. Each of the above tests is used 
to look for evidence on the LOP, thus providing particular insights into its nature (a list of 
Literature Review on the Law of One Price 
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some typical literature of the LOP can be found in Appendix). For each of these approaches, a 
brief description of the concept is provided, underlying its main equations in this section.  
3.1 Causality Tests 
From the 1970s, the two most popular procedures have been done to see the violations of the 
LOP on various agricultural commodities. First, causality tests with static models for price 
levels (Richardson, 1978; Protopapadakis and Stoll, 1983; Jabara and Schwartz, 1987; Smith, 
1988; Giovannini, 1988):  
 
                                                        
    +     
 +                                                          (3) 
A commodity price in one market  (  
 ) i                                 ‘  p        
another market   (  
 ). The LOP holds if      and the constant term      with exception 
of the arbitrary deviations caused by the error term (   ); in most cases,    is non-zero 
interpreted as constant trade costs
2
 or quality differences. 
Second, dynamic models for price lag levels (Ravallion, 1986; Protopapadakis and Stoll, 1986) 
considering that the price adjustment takes time:  
                                        
   + ∑   
 
       
 + ∑   
 
       
 +                                           (4) 
Specifications in equation (4) could distinguish short- and long-run effects. There is a 
relationship, or in statistical terms that   
  causes   
 , if a joint test that all      is rejected.
 3
 
The LOP holds in a static sense which is exactly shown in equation (3) if          , and 
    ,     ; in a dynamic sense if ∑   + ∑      . 
The above causality methods of testing the LOP typically assume that parity holds 
contemporaneously. These approaches overlook the fact that commodity arbitrage (especially 
for international trade) takes place over time and across space. So they have, for the most part, 
neglected the role of expectations and trade costs. Since price linkages are not 
                                                             
2 If the price series are in their logarithmic terms,     is assumed to present the proportional trade costs; If not,    is assumed 
to present the addictive trade costs. 
3 If we interchange price variables by putting   
  as the dependent price series in equation (4), that the null hypothesis   
  
causes   
   Markets are independent if there is no causality found. 
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contemporaneous and may involve delivery lags, agents have expectations that they might 
formulate about prices at the time of delivery.
4
 
For improvement, Goodwin et al. (1990a, 1990b) test the LOP in a rational expectation 
version. Rational expectation models are also causality tests, the difference is that price 
expectations are involved when the test for the LOP. First, they follow the standard version of 
testing the LOP as Richardson (1978) and then exploit a model which attempts to study the 
role of expectations instead of contemporaneous prices (domestic and foreign). They express 
the expectations in an augmented version of of the LOP as:
 5
 
                                            
    {  +   
 (    
 )
  
      }                                            (5) 
Parameter vector   {        }  is to be estimated,     is the observable freight rate. 
Adherence to the LOP is proved if values of    are not significantly different from one. 
Note that, for causality tests, price series should be stationary. Still, in most of the previous 
work done by using causality tests, the stationarity property of their price series is not so clear. 
If price series are not stationary, the LOP would be over-rejected by using causality methods, 
as critical values for the hypothesis are increased (Asche et al., 2004). So when price series 
show nonstationary probability characteristics (through a Dickey-Fuller test (DF) in equation 
(6)
6
 or the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF) in equation (7)
7
), the above econometric 
approaches are no longer valid, regression estimates of the standard errors on the estimates of 
   and    in equation (3) will be inconsistent. 
                                                       +       +                                                              (6) 
Where   represents first differences, for example            . The lag length   is chosen 
in the ADF test to generate a white noise   , 
                                          +    +      + ∑   
 
        +                                     (7) 
                                                             
4 Commodity delivery lags necessarily raise at least three issues of: (a) price expectations, since agents must formulate 
expectations about prices at the time of delivery, (b) the uncertainty and information-gathering costs, which may be a 
significant determinant of trade costs, and (c) the possibility of non-contemporaneous price linkages (Fackler and Goodwin, 
2001).  
5 Equation (5) is expressed as   
    +   {(    
 )
  }        in Goodwin et al. (1990b).        
6 See Baffes (1991), p. 1267 
7 See Baffes (1991), p. 1267; Gordon and Hannesson (1996), equation (3); Asche et al. (2004), equation (5); Vinuya (2007), 
equation (3). Time trend   can be omitted, as showed in Ardeni (1989), p665; Asche et al. (1999), equation (8). 
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To determine whether    is non-stationary by using DF test or ADF test, one tests the null 
hypothesis of non-stationarity by testing whether     (  ：   is not     ) against the 
alternative of stationarity     and significantly different from 0 (   is     ). First, the DF 
test or ADF test is used on prices and then duplicated for the first differences of prices. Once 
prices are confirmed to be      with rejecting the null hypothesis at the conventional 
significance level on the first differences of the prices, they are regarded as possible 
cointegration candidates (Vinuya, 2007). 
3.2 Cointegration analysis 
Cointegration analysis is a dynamic regression based on a point location model. Indeed, 
commodity price series are often    , which need to be differentiated before becoming 
stationary. Cointegration methods presuppose that time series exhibiting non-stationary will 
be linked by a long-run relationship with stationary residuals, which is the case of the LOP 
holds in the long-run despite short-run piece variations.  
A two-step Engle and Granger (1987) procedure has been developed to carry out the 
estimation (Ardeni, 1989; Baffes, 1991; Zanias, 1993; Gordon and Hannesson, 1996) by 
confirming the non-stationarity and integration order of price series. First, one estimates the 
equilibrium relationship among the variables using OLS for equation (3). Second, the 
residuals (   ) from equation (3) are tested for non-stationarity by running equation (6) or (7). 
In particular, the LOP presumes that the LOP holds with the cointegration parameter being 
one (Baffes, 1991). In this case, the time-series property of the residual term     is tested 
(testing whether  ̂  is      in equation (8)
8
 or say   ̂  is      in equation (3)). If the residual is 
stationary,   
  and   
  are in long-run and stable equilibrium, 
                                                                  
    
                                                               (8) 
However, the two-step procedure is not possible for a statistically direct test for the LOP since 
it has no well-defined limitation of distributions. Moreover, the results from Engle and 
Granger tests might depend on which price one normalizes in the regression (Asche et al., 
1999; Dawson and Dey, 2002; Asche et al., 2004), and the first step OLS estimation may 
result in ― p                  ‖          D     -Watson (DW) statistic below one (Ardeni, 
1989). Normal statistical inference and tests for the LOP are invalid when a negative 
                                                             
8 Then     in equation (7) and (8) could be written as    ,       +    +      + ∑   
 
        +    (Gordon and 
Hannesson ,1996, p. 232 note c in table 3). 
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relationship between price series shows up, though cointegration tests for a relationship 
between two substituted commodities are possible (Asche et al., 1999).  
The Johansen approach is desired over the procedure proposed by Engle and Grange (1987) 
and has been verified to be appealing in some literature developed to testing the LOP recently 
(Vinuya, 2007). Johansen (1988) develops a method for producing test statistics (i.e., 
likelihood ratios) with exactly limited distributions                  ―      ‖              LOP 
in a bivariate or multivariate setting (Goodwin, 1992; Asche et al., 1999) by carrying out the 
following vector autoregressive (VAR) representation:
 9
  
                                           ∑       
   
   +       + +                                                  (9) 
Where each    is a     matrix of parameters,    is an       vector of constant terms, 
and    is an     vector of noises with a mean zero, covariance matrix and normal over 




                                             ∑   
   
       +       +  +                                             (10) 
Where      +   +   +   +   and          .    is the long-run solution to 
equation (9). If    is     ,     must be     , the first     elements are also stationary.    
are also assumed to be stationary. Thus    is a matrix of zeroes,    includes cointegrating 
vectors.   is the rank of   , which determines the combination numbers of   .  
There are three possible ranks: (a)    , the prices are     ; (b)    , no linear 
combination occurs,    are stationary; and (c)      ,   stationary linear combinations of 
   exist.  
A rank of     in a multivariate system with   price series means that prices are driven by 
only one stochastic trend. For        ,    could be decomposed such that      
 , 
where   (adjustment vector) and   (cointegrating vector) are both     matrixes. 11 
                                                             
9 VAR representation stands for the same meaning as equation (5) in Asche et al. (1999), equation (3) in Asche et al. (2004), 
equation (4) in Vinuya (2007). Here I point out one error on p. 251 in Vinuya (2007),   should be from 1 to    , not 1 to   
as showed in equation (4) and (5) on page 251. 
10 See equation (6) in Asche et al. (1999); equation (4) in Dawson and Dey (2002); equation (4) in Asche et al. (2004); 
equation (2) in Nielsen (2005); equation (5) in Vinuya (2007). 
11   can be identified by the maximum eigenvalue test and the trace test (Johansen, 1995). 
Literature Review on the Law of One Price 
17 
 
From the 1990s to the early 21
st
 century, numerous applications for testing the LOP by using 
Johansen cointegration techniques covering various commodities (Gordon and Hannesson, 
1996; Asche et al., 1999; Asche et al., 2004; Nielsen, 2005).  
In these studies, the LOP test turns into a test for if the columns of    matrix sum to zero. For 
example, for four price series,        ,   is a     matrix represented as: 
  [ 
       
    
 
 
      
        
 
   
]                                                     (11) 
When    ,    [  
       
 ]  with two price series both are     ,    , giving the 
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 ]                 (12) 
The LOP is tested as a long-run concept by imposing the null hypothesis restriction      
and       (   [   ]) using a likelihood ratio (LR) statistic since the matrix   contains 
long-run parameters. This test is then equivalent to the test of the LOP based on equation (4). 
If the null cannot be rejected, the markets are perfectly integrated, while if the null is rejected, 
imperfect market integration is implied. 
However, Baffes (1991) points out that cointegration alone is not sufficient to conclude that 
the LOP holds. He demonstrates that the linear relationship between prices should have a 
slope of one, or equivalently, that the price spreads are stationary. The practical importance of 
the Johansen test is as a pre-test for other econometric tests not just as a test in its own right 
(Baulch, 1997b). Cointegration based on the LOP is with criticisms. First, the main critique is 
that cointegration is neither necessary nor is it a sufficient condition for market integration 
(Barret, 1996; McNew and Fackler, 1997; Miljkovic, 1999; Miljkovic and Rodney, 2001). 
They claim that integrated markets might not be cointegrated if transport costs (as well as 
other costs not explicitly included in the LOP equation) are nonstationary; Second, when 
supply and demand shocks are cointegrated across markets that are spatially separated, price 
series might display cointegrated relationship even though markets are not integrated with the 
absence of trade flow; And third, a constant long-run margin between markets could be 
                                                             
12 See equation (5) in Dawson and Dey (2002), they include a dummy   as a vector of other deterministic components, such 
as seasonality and outliers. Nielsen (2005) includes a trend   and a dummy D in equation (4). 
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caused by the monopolist and other sources of inefficiencies (Dercon and van Campenhout, 
1999). 
3.3 Parity bounds model 
The above analysis based on prices tells us little or nothing about the actual role played by 
trade costs and trade behavior. Indeed, under some commonly occurring conditions (such as 
when trade is discontinuous), they prove untrustworthy. As showed in Figure 2, if a shock 
happened in market B, trade flows will be affected. Distortions in arbitrage (such as policy 
intervention, unpredicted outbreak) may trigger non-linearities; bidirectional or reversed trade 
direction when   
    
 , trade direction changes from A to B to B to A
13
 , or trade costs are 
nonstationary (Barrett and Li, 2002). At these break points, the slope of the relation between 
prices is zero (   in equation (3)), whereas at other times it is roughly one. The greater the 
trade costs between markets, the more suspect the findings of linear cointegration regressions. 
Omission of trade costs would lead to estimated    biased toward zero (Kinnucan and Zhang, 
2015). 







Source: own expression based on von Cramon-Taubadel‟s (2019) lecture notes. 
If time-series data were accessible on trade costs and trade flows in addition to nominal 
commodity prices, issues from conventional tests could be precluded (Baulch, 1997b). Parity 
bounds model (PBM, also called switching regime models) provides estimates determined 
based on this information. The extent of spatial price efficiency could be measured by how 
                                                             
13 If there is a new equilibrium where commodity is traded from B to A instead A to B, there has no work being done to test if 
the LOP still holds in this case, or when trade is bidirectional both from A to B and from B to A, then the work for testing the 
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  → B   ← B 
Literature Review on the Law of One Price 
19 
 
often violations of the LOP occur by introducing trade costs for the same commodity trade 
between different locations continuously. The efficiency of spatial arbitrage can be tested by 
repetitively calculating whether trade takes place whenever price differences between two 
markets were no less than trade costs if accurate information on trade costs at each time point 
is available (Baulch, 1997b). 
PBM was proposed first by Spiller and Huang (1986), then carried forward by Sexton et al. 
(1991), Baulch (1997b), and others by combining stochastic frontier and switching regression 
        S             (1991)        Sp          H    ‘  (1986)                        
regimes: (a) efficient arbitrage (i.e., the LOP, Regime 1), (b) relative glut (Regime 2), and (c) 
relative shortage (Regime 3) that exhaust the possible arbitrage conditions between the 
producing location and any ending market in an application of U.S. celery. They find the 
probability of binding arbitrage does increase substantially with the adoption of lags related to 
the physical trade of the commodity from California to faraway markets. Baulch (1997b) 
estimates PBM to compare observed price differences against exogenously predicted cross-
market transport costs, thereby estimates the three probabilities for three regimes that – rents 
to arbitrage are zero (regime 1), positive (regime 2), or negative (regime 3) with of   
  
  
       
    
  separately as shown in Table 1;   
   is the trade costs from   to   at time  . 
The LOP holds when efficient arbitrage occurs between two markets, the price difference is 
equal to the trade cost (rents to arbitrage are zero) with the probability of   
  in regime 1.  
Table 1. Description of three regimes 
  
     
    
    
   
          
  
    
    
    
   
  
    
    
   
    
Continuous trade   
  (Regime 1)   
  (Regime 2)     
    
  (Regime 3) 
 Note:   
  P                ,   
  P        B      , R=Rent,   T             Source: own representation, based on 
Baulch (1997b).  
H      B       (2017)        B     ‘  (1997b) PBM to determine the price efficiency of 
spatially separated urea markets of New Orleans-Middle East. Park et al. (2002) estimate a 
PBM of interregional grain (maize and rice) trade for four sub-periods (1988-89, 1990-91, 
1992-93, and 1994-95) to characterize how multiple aspects (arbitrage, trade costs, autarky 
rate) of market performance change during their research period which is exactly the years 
with economic transition in China. 
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However, the regime models in some studies (Sexton et al., 1991; Hu and Brorsen, 2017) still 
rely on prices, Baulch (1997b) and Park et al. (2002) add information on trade costs. They fail 
to disentangle equilibrium and integration. Price differentials no more than trade costs are 
  fi       ―           ‖              fl  s of a commodity or no transmission of price 
shocks occur                                                    fi      ―         ‖ 
whenever price differentials are larger than trade costs, despite whether there are observed 
      fl    (B           L   2002)  T     fl                                            
market integration beyond that offered by observable price and trade cost data (Barrett and Li, 
2002). Barrett and Li (2002) augment the switching regime models by estimating a mixture 
distribution model with a combination of price, trade cost, and physical trade flow data based 
on maximum likelihood and a corroborating nonparametric test.  So they distinguish between 
market integration and competitive market equilibrium by defining six regimes instead of 
three under trade and no trade situations.  
Table 2. Description of six regimes 
  
     
    
    
   
          
  
    
    
   
   
  
    
    
   
    
Trade    (Regime 1)    (Regime 2)    (Regime 3) 
No trade    (Regime 4)    (Regime 5)    (Regime 6) 
Source: own representation, based on Barrett and Li (2002). 
Two categories of trade costs   
    and three categories of spatial arbitrage   
   (zero, positive, 
or negative) yield six regimes defining four possible market conditions: 
14
 
 Perfect integration (regime 1 and 2 with the probability of   +   ); 
 Segmented equilibrium (regime 6 with the probability of   ); 
 Imperfect integration (regime 3 and 5 with the probability of   +   ); 
 Segmented disequilibrium (regime 4 with the probability of   ).  
                                                             
14
 i) In Regime 1 and 2, trade takes place and opportunities for spatial arbitrage are exhausted, the markets are integrated and 
in spatial equilibrium; ii) in Regime 6, returns to spatial arbitrage are negative and, thus, no trade takes place, the markets are 
in spatial equilibrium but not integrated; iii) In Regime 3 and 5, trade takes place but does not exhaust opportunities for 
spatial arbitrage, the markets are integrated but not in spatial equilibrium; and iv) In regime 4, trade does not take place 
despite the fact that there are opportunities for spatial arbitrage, the markets are neither integrated nor in spatial equilibrium.  
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Following Barrett and Li (2002), Hillen (2019) estimates an extended PBM by using detailed, 
transaction-based data on trade flows and trade costs of Italian and Swiss tomato markets. She 
finds that though seasonal tariff rate quotas lead to inefficiencies and create rents for 
importers, they are effective in the protection of domestic tomato production against 
competing for tomota imports. 
PBM is expressive but seems to take an extremely stringent view of the LOP. PBM assumes 
successive trade flows and focuses on either veiled direction of trade flows or, holding the 
direction constant of trade flows, the sign, and magnitude of summed transactions costs and 
arbitrage p  fi                         fl   p        (S              1991; B       1997 ; H  
and Brorsen, 2017). An interesting example is given by von Cramon-Taubadel and Goodwin 
(2021), a discernable commodity flow between two vendors offering a fresh product for sale 
                   ‘                                    even though these traders are part of a 
well-integrated market.  
Three limitations of the PBM are drawn by Baulch (1997b): (a) PBM is not dynamic, i.e. only 
offer static comparisons between prices because only contemporaneous spreads are used. 
Lagged price adjustments presumed by the Granger causality and Ravallion‘s (1986) model 
are hard to be considered fully in PBM; (b) Inaccurate transactions costs would lead to a wide 
transaction costs band or problems with the convergence of the maximum likelihood 
procedure; (c) Reasons of the violations of the spatial arbitrage conditions are not clear even 
they indicate the lack of market integration. Policy implications could be misleading if follow 
directly from the results of PBM. 
4 Empirical evidence from the LOP tests 
4.1 Evidence from previous literature 
The conclusion of the empirical evidence from the LOP test results is elusive. The above tests 
are interpreted as tests that are conditional on assumptions regarding trade linkages but not so 
much as tests of equilibrium conditions. For example, Dawson and Dey (2002) conclude the 
LOP holds between prices that are cointegrated and the spatial market integration is perfect so 
that a price change in one market is a response in all other markets. But most conclusions 
drawn after testing are neither clear nor consistent to different extents expressing the LOP 
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 fails - ―    LOP                  p                                j     ‖ (R           
1978); ―    LOP, fails, as a long-run relationship, and that deviations from the long-
run pattern are not temporary but p        ‖ (        1989)   
 is in force, are nearly perfect substitutes for each other (Nielsen, 2005).  
 conditionally fails or holds in an ambiguous statement – ―                        -
                        ‖ (G          H          1996);    ―            j           
             p                     ‖ (B       1991); ― pp                         
                       ‖ (Z       1993); ―p        poorly, if trade costs exist and 
trade does not occur i        p     ‖ (B      1997 ). 
 holds -              j     ‖ (G        1990)    ― pp                 ‖ (O        1986; 
Goodwin et al., 1990a, 1990 );  ―                               ‖ (              1999; 
D       1999); ―        pp                     ‖ (              2004; V       2007);  
There is mixed empirical evidence using the same dataset but different model specification. 
For example, comparing the study of Ardeni (1989) to Baffes (1991), the former one finds the 
LOP holds at least in the long run while the latter one finds that the LOP indeed holds for 
markets considered. Asche et al. (2004) find that even one cointegration vector exists, the 




Since the procedure of PBM for testing the LOP is different from the procedures by using 
causality (static or dynamic or both) or cointegration models, the interpretation of the results 
is also different,  
 ―N                  p                                             with significant 
p          ‖ (S              1991)           p                          with 100% 
probability (  +     ) never happens; 
 The LOP holds in a certain time - ― he LOP does not hold 23% of th      ‖ (H      
Brorsen, 2017); Exporters in North America make positive marginal arbitrage profits 
30 to 37% of the time into Japan (Barrett and Li, 2002); 
 Rice markets in the Philippines are integrated almost 100% of the time within a single 
period (Baulch, 1997b). 
There is also mixed expression using the same model specification (e.g. switching regime 
model). Sexton et al. (1991) interpret the LOP holds with the probability of    
   and does not 
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hold with the probability of     
 , Baulch (1997b) and Hu and Brorsen (2017) interpret the 
probabilities summed of regime 1 up with regime 2, (  
 +   
  ) as the probability of market 
integration and the LOP and the probability of     
    
  as not holding, that is why Sexton 
et al. (1991) conclude almost all cases significantly departed from the efficient arbitrage 
condition, because   
  is quite small if we make this condition so strict with only equaling the 
transport costs. 
We could see previous research using different test procedures interpret their results 
differently, and different conclusions are sometimes drawn from the same dataset depending 
on the empirical methods used. Although differences in the data and methodologies employed 
accord one work not straightforward comparable to another, what brings about is a fuzzy 
image in which evidence and expressions are not clear. 
4.2 More about the LOP 
Instead of testing the LOP, a theoretical benchmark is driven for the strong version of the 
LOP in this section and will be applied in Chapters III and IV.  
If arbitrage condition holds with price differences being trade costs between market   and   
where equation (1) is taken with an equality sign, the spatial equilibrium condition can be 
written as  
                                                            
    
 +                                                       (13) 
The elasticity of price transmission between two markets that satisfy this condition,    
  , is 
defined as 
                                                       
   
   
 





    
   
  
                                                     (14) 
The higher the trade costs     , the lower the elasticity of price transmission between them. 
Assume that commodity trade costs are a function of the distance between two markets: 
                                                                                                          (15) 
    is an increasing function of the distance between   and  .Where     is the distance 
between markets   and  , and with 
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Combining equations (14) and (15), we expect that the elasticity of price transmission 
between two markets is a decreasing function of the distance between them. Hence, we expect 
that estimated elasticity of price transmission in empirical work (   in equation (3)) which is 
an estimate of the elasticity    
  , will be a decreasing function of the distance between 
markets   and  , 
     
   
    
  .  
Moving commodities in space can be viewed as a special case of the processing that takes 
p        G      ‘  (1975)                   commodity at an export market      ‗p        ‘ 




     
   
      
  
                                                                                   (16) 
In this case, the elasticity of input substitution between the export commodity (on market  ) 
and the transportation input equals 0, the supply of the transportation input will typically be 
price elastic, and the cost-share of the transportation input in the price of the product at the 
import location   will typically be low. Under these conditions, the elasticity of price 
transmission will tend towards the cost share of the commodity in the export location   in the 
price of the product in the import location  .  
The benchmark of estimated elasticity of price transmission as a function of    , which is 
regarded as a ―                     ‖                            the maximum elasticity of 
price transmission, and thus the minimum value of     that can be attained.  
5 Additional issues: the role of transport costs and trade flow 
Trade costs are most often mentioned by economists for the inconsistent LOP testing results. 
Most of the above studies state that violations of the strong form of the LOP may indicate an 
existence of transactions costs or lack of a stable trade relationship (or both). Unfortunately, it 
is universally admitted that time-series data on trade costs (an obvious component is transport 
costs) are unusually available to economists and, even when they are, such data are rarely of 
the same periodicity as the agricultural commodity price data which are available with high 
frequency (Baulch, 1997b).  
                                                             
15       G      ‘  (1975  p  404)               ̅  
        
          
, see also Kinnucan and Zhang (2015). 
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In the body of tests, no transport costs are involved at all in the very early causality models 
(Isard, 1977; Ravallion, 1986; Officer, 1986; Jabara and Schwartz, 1987; Giovannini, 1988) to 
currently popular cointegration models (Ardeni, 1989; Asche et al., 1999; Asche et al., 2004; 
Nielsen, 2005; Vinuya, 2007). Dragen and Paul (2001) argue that a study like Asche et al. 
(1999) does not analyze market integration but rather conduct a study on market efficiency 
using price data alone with no trade costs and trade flow data involved. Generally such study 
will not draw a force-fitting inference of the LOP. So studies that employ empirical 
techniques such as cointegration could not confirm or disconfirm the LOP (McNew and 
Fackler, 1997; Dragen, 1999; Dragen and Paul, 2001). 
In some studies, trade costs are estimated based on inter-market price differentials (Faminow 
and Benson, 1990), treated as a proportion of commodity price (Ravallion, 1986; Goodwin, 
1990), or interpreted as the estimated constant (Asche et al., 2004). Per-unit transportation 
charge, freight rates are got attention as a direct measure of transport in some studies costs 
(e.g., Goodwin et al., 1990a, 1990b). Ravallion (1986) and Dawson and Dey (2002) get 
consistent results by focusing on rice markets in Bangladesh but for different periods 
(Richardson (1978), from 1972 to 1975; Dawson and Dey (2002), from 1992 to 1997). 
Ravallion (1986) finds the average price differentials accord roughly with distances, and 
Dawson and Dey (2002) show that transport costs vary with geographic distance directly. 
While Baffes (1991) does find the freight rates are stationary and cointegrated with price 
differences on testing the LOP for seven commodities among four countries. Goodwin et al. 
(1990b) employ nonparametric tests (Frenkel and Levich, 1975) that incorporate estimating 
the band of transactions costs and provide additional evidence demonstrating the LOP in an 
expectations-augmented version of the LOP. Given the importance of oil prices (e.g., diesel 
fuel, petrol) as a component of transport costs, Dillon and Barrett (2015) present that 
worldwide fuel prices do have considerable effects on maize prices mainly through transport 
costs rather than prices of maize themselves.  
Another issue is about trade flow and the direction change of trade flow: estimating price 
relationships with data (often wholesale and retail prices) that are assumed in one-direction 
trade, and evidence of co-movement and dynamic interactions are often found. But, as pointed 
out by von Cramon-Taubadel and Goodwin (2021), the relationship between dynamic 
interplays and the underlying arbitrage conditions at the specific transaction level are 





 The existed literature has been to take no notice of this issue and only concerns the 
price of an exported market to the price of one of the imported markets. 
6 Concluding remarks 
As conveyed in the quote by Marshall (1890) at the beginning of this chapter, and concluded 
by von Cramon-Taubadel and Goodwin (2021) by quoting ―In a single market, all of these 
price structures are interrelated and simultaneously determined through transfer costs…‖ 
(Bressler and King, 1970), yes, the LOP lives well in the spatial sense. Increasingly 
complicated econometric techniques have been developed for testing the LOP covering a 
diverse set of commodities since the 1970s, from causality tests with static models for price 
levels to dynamic models for price lag levels since the 1980s by considering that the price 
adjustment could take time.  
The LOP has probably been more thoroughly violated by empirical evidence than any other 
economic law (Williamson, 1986; Miljkovic, 1999). It is often violated, as its assumptions are 
extremely strict. With most cases characterized by heterogeneous commodities, a low 
competition degree, complicated trade-in space and time, and (often) highly policy regulations, 
its empirical expression remains controversial. The market should be explicitly understood 
when any interpretations are given in the question.  
The LOP has little meaning if we effectively assume that it always holds, and any empirical 
violations are caused by using the wrong empirical test, or missing data. We could assume the 
more perfect a market is, the more adherence to the LOP for all parts of the market at the 
same time. So if we regard the LOP as an equilibrium condition, then what we could focus on 
is how far or how large the deviation from the LOP is for the same commodity in specific 
                     j                                                           ―       ‖       
elusively stated after implementing the intuitively appealing testing procedure.  
Even when a value closes one is found, temporary deviations from the LOP arise, which we 
ascribe to transport costs and other impediments to arbitrage in the short-run (Protopapadakis 
                                                             
16 As one simple case with one shock happening, the price relationship changes from   
    
  to    
    
 , redirecting the 
trade flow from A to B to B to A as showed in Figure 2. 





 A fundamental tendency of the LOP would hold in the long run despite the 
existence of short-run deviations.  
The mechanisms that govern price transmission and its economic impacts could be 
understood thoroughly with more available new data which are the spark for new methods 
(Lloyd, 2017). If we had data on every price and cost that is relevant, at some sufficiently 
high observation frequency we should be able to see that the LOP is violated. If we observe 
frequently enough, we should sometimes see shocks disturb the equilibrium, even if it is only 
for a brief moment.  
To bridge the gap, advanced procedures should be proposed to benchmark the LOP as a 
reference in the model. In part of this research, by conducting cointegration analysis coupled 
with stochastic frontier models, an explicit attempt would be made at benchmarking the 
strong version of the LOP. The main innovation is that we explicitly account for the effects of 
distance and transport costs on the expected elasticity of price transmission. The result is of 
particular importance because it makes the LOP a benchmark and it directs the level of 
deviations from the LOP rather than assume its existence before the price to be used is 
selected. The results also give us additional evidence regarding the direct link between 
distances (transport costs) and the LOP and the elasticity of price transmission in the long run. 
                                                             
17  Note value one. For international trade analysis, it is the estimated coefficient of exchange rate, see for example 
(Protopapadakis and Stoll (1983, p.1435). For commodities at the same currency, it is the estimated elasticity of price 
transmission between markets (e.g.    in equation (3)). 
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Appendix of Chapter II 
Table A.1: Summary of some typical literature about the Law of One Price 
Authors Location Product Method of analysis Conclusion 
Isard (1977) International  Correlation Closely substantial and persistent effects 
Richardson (1978) US/Canada AC Causality-Static  Fails uniformly 
Ravallion (1986) Bangladesh Rice Causality-Dynamic  Significant departures from short- and long-
run 
Liliane and Michel (1981) AC Causality-Static Holds for primary products 
Protopapadakis and Stoll (1983) International AC Causality- Static Holds for most commodities 
Officer (1986) International (22 countries) Nonlinear  Received strong support 
Protopapadakis and Stoll (1986) International AC Causality-Dynamic Holds in the long-run, not in the short-run 
Jabara and Schwartz (1987) Japan/US AC Causality-Static  Significant deviations in some instances 
Smith (1988) US/Canada/Australia/Argentina 
AC 
Causality-Static  Does hold, to an approximation 
Giovannini (1988) Japan Domestic and export Causality-Static  
Ardeni (1989) International* Engle and Granger  As a long-run relationship, fails 
Faminow and Benson (1990) Canada Hogs Causality-Dynamic  The pricing system disintegrated  
Goodwin (1990)  International Natural rubber REM Fail to reject the LOP 
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Goodwin et al. (1990a)  US/Rotterdam 17 AC REM Stronger support for the LOP 
Goodwin et al. (1990b) US/Rotterdam 17 AC REM+Nonparametric  The LOP appears quite strong 
Baffes (1991) International* Engle and Granger  In most cases, cannot be rejected 
Sexton et al. (1991) US Celery PBM Nearly all cases departed with a significant 
probability 
Goodwin (1992) International wheat Multivariate Johansen Adjusted for freight rates, is fully supported 
Zanias (1993) European Community AC Engle and Granger  appears valid in half the combinations 
considered 
Gordon and Hannesson (1996) European and US Cod Fish EG + Johansen Weak evidence  
Baulch (1997b)  Philippines Rice PBM Violations of the spatial arbitrage  
Baulch (1997a) - Review  
Asche et al. (1999) International Salmon Johansen (1988) The LOP holds for an international 
Dragan (1999)  - Review  
Fackler and Goodwin (2001) - Review  
Dawson and Dey(2002) Bangladesh rice Johansen (1988) Rice markets are perfectly integrated 
Park et al. (2002)      ‘                PBM The extent of market integration varies over 
the years 
Asche et al. (2004) France Whitefish Johansen + LOP Well-integrated, the LOP holds 
Conforti (2004) AC   
Literature Review on the Law of One Price 
30 
 
Nielsen (2005) European Whitefish Johansen + LOP Rejected 
Rapsomanikis et al (2006)  Food and cash crop markets Review + case studies An ambiguous concept 
Vinuya (2007) International Shrimp Johansen + LOP Integrated, in support of the LOP 
Emmanouilides and Fousekis (2012) EU pork Strong + weak   Valid for all market pairs 
Dillon and Barrett (2015) Maize in east Africa Engle and Granger The LOP does not hold across the border 
Hu and Brorsen (2017) US Urea PBM Does not hold 23% of the time 
von Cramon-Taubadel and Goodwin 
(2021) 
 Review The LOP is alive and well 
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Abstract 
Past studies have used standard regression techniques to explain variation in estimated 
measures of the strength and speed of price transmission. We propose an alternative method 
for benchmarking the magnitude and speed of restoring market efficiency that combines 
cointegration analysis coupled with frontier estimation methods. The use of frontier methods 
provides a convenient way of accounting for sampling error in estimated measures of price 
transmission. We illustrate the proposed method using price data from 30 provincial pork 
markets in China from 2000 to 2017. As expected, the frontier magnitude and speed of 
restoring market efficiency both fall with increasing distance between two markets. We find 
significant province effects in the magnitude of market efficiency. Provinces located farther to 
the south and west display lower levels of market efficiencies than those located in the 
northeast and central regions of China. 
Keywords: Spatial price transmission, market efficiency, VECM, stochastic frontier 
benchmark  
1 Introduction 
A vast literature on spatial price transmission for agricultural commodities has accumulated 
over the last six decades. Harriss (1979) cites dozens of studies from the 1960s and 1970s 
based on the analysis of correlation coefficients between prices. Ardeni (1989) was the first in 
agricultural economics to use the cointegration methods that dominate the literature today. 
Cointegration methods, specifically error correction models (ECMs), make it possible to 
simultaneously estimate both the long-run equilibrium relationship between prices at different 
locations and the error correction mechanism that restores this equilibrium relationship 
whenever it is disturbed by shocks. Over time, increasingly sophisticated ECMs have been 
used to account for different types of non-linearity or regime dependence in price 
transmission. These include asymmetric ECMs (von Cramon-Taubadel, 1998); ECMs that 
include threshold effects in long-run equilibrium relationships (threshold cointegration – 
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Gonzalo and Pitarakis, 2006) as well as in error correction (threshold autoregression – 
Abdulai, 2000; threshold ECMs – Goodwin and Piggott, 2001; Greb et al., 2013); non-
parametric ECMs (Serra et al., 2006; Guney et al. 2019); Markov-switching ECMs (Brümmer 
et al., 2009); and other forms of ECM with time-varying error correction (such as state space 
models – Adämmer and Bohl, 2015, 2018; Vollmer et al. 2020). All of these methods are 
motivated by efforts to account for the fact that the relationship between two prices in space 
will not necessarily be constant over time due to phenomena such as changes in trade costs, 
policies and the direction of trade (von Cramon-Taubadel and Goodwin, 2021). Cointegration 
methods can produce misleading results if one fails to account for these sources of non-
linearity in equilibrium relationships between prices (Barrett, 1996; McNew, 1996; McNew 
and Fackler, 1997). 
Ultimately, researchers who employ these methods aim to draw conclusions about market 
integration and efficiency. As Barrett (2001) points out, economists typically define 
integration in terms of the Law of One Price (LOP); if the LOP holds between two markets, 
then they are integrated, and vice versa. However, this definition is not intuitively appealing 
to non-economists, who typically define integration in terms of trade; if trade takes place 
between two markets, then they are integrated, and vice versa. To improve communication 
                        p          p                                                   ‘ 
awareness of the important assumptions that underlie price transmission and market 
integration analysis, Barrett (2001, p. 20) therefore argues that economists should distinguish 
―        flow-based notions of integration and price-based notions of efficiency based on 
economic concepts of equilibrium‖             LOP  D           p                         
(Enke, 1951; Samuelson, 1952; Takayama and Judge, 1972), Barrett and Li (2002) identify 
four combinations of integration and equilibrium that can hold between two markets:  
I. Perfect integration, in which trade takes place and opportunities for spatial arbitrage 
are exhausted – in this case the markets are integrated and in spatial equilibrium;  
II. Segmented equilibrium, in which returns to spatial arbitrage are negative and, thus, no 
trade takes place – in this case the markets are not integrated but nevertheless in 
spatial equilibrium;  
III. Imperfect integration, in which trade takes place but does not exhaust opportunities for 
spatial arbitrage – in this case the markets are integrated but not in spatial equilibrium; 
and  
IV. Segmented disequilibrium, in which no trade takes place despite opportunities for 
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spatial arbitrage– in this case the markets are neither integrated nor in spatial 
equilibrium.  
If, following Barrett (2001), we consider market efficiency to be synonymous with 
equilibrium, then conditions i) and ii) above are efficient, while conditions iii) and iv) are not. 
In the former two, there are no unrealized potential Pareto improvements; in the latter two 
there are.  
These conclusions are based on a static concept of efficiency – given a set of demand and 
supply conditions on two (or more) markets in space, and trade costs between them, they are 
either in equilibrium and therefore efficient, or not.
1
 Market efficiency, however, also has two 
additional dynamic dimensions. First, trade costs vary over time and space due to technology 
(e.g. the introduction of refrigeration; Goodwin et al., 2002), infrastructure (e.g. improved 
road and rail systems; Donaldson, 2018; Zant, 2018) and institutions (e.g. differences in tariff 
levels or the administrative costs of customs procedures). Consider two otherwise identical 
pairs of markets:   and  , and   and  .   and   are connected by a paved highway,   and   
by a dirt track. Even if each pair is in spatial equilibrium and can therefore be considered 
efficient, comparison of the two pairs will reveal that lower trade costs lead to more trade and 
a higher level of aggregate welfare in   and   than in   and  . Hence, we can conclude that 
  and   are more efficient than   and  . Indeed, if trade costs between   and   are 
prohibitively high, they will be in segmented equilibrium (condition II above), and realise no 
welfare gains from trade. In the following we refer to this as the relative magnitude of 
efficiency, and in section 2 below we demonstrate that it can be measured using the long-run 
elasticity of price transmission between two markets. 
Second, since moving agricultural products between markets takes time, trade and prices 
cannot adjust instantaneously to shocks that disturb equilibrium (Ravallion, 1986).
2
 
Furthermore, even where unit trade costs between pairs of markets are identical, differences in 
technology, infrastructure and institutions might lead to differences in the volumes of trade 
that can flow between them per unit of time. If it is possible to move twice as many tons of a 
                                                             
1 These conclusions are also based on the assumption that supply and demand on the markets in question accurately reflect 
preferences and economic costs. If prices on market   follow a speculative bubble, or if they are distorted by the exercise of 
market power or an externality, then economic efficiency on neighbouring market   will not necessarily be increased by 
equilibrium with  ;   might be better off in segmented disequilibrium with respect to  . 
2 No price adjustment is truly instantaneous, even on financial markets with very rapid trade. However, if an adjustment 
begins and ends within the interval between observations of the available price data, it will appear instantaneous. This 
highlights the importance of working with data of sufficient frequency. 
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product per unit of time between   and   as between   and  , all other things being equal, 
then when both pairs are subjected to a given shock,   and   can be expected to return to 
equilibrium, and thus efficiency, more rapidly following the shock than   and  . In the 
following we refer to this as the relative speed of restoring efficiency, and in section 2 below 
measure it using the so-called adjustment parameters from a bivariate vector error correction 
model (VECM) of the prices on two markets. 
These two dimensions of efficiency – the magnitude of the gains from trade that can be 
realised in equilibrium, and the speed with which equilibrium and thus efficiency is restored 
following shocks – will typically be interrelated. For example, streamlining customs 
procedures between two countries can increase per period volumes of trade between them, 
leading to more rapid restoration of spatial equilibrium following a shock. But it might also 
reduce trade costs by reducing processing fees and/or the scope for discretionary behavior and 
the extraction of bribes by customs officials, and thus increase total trade volumes and gains 
from trade. Similarly, widening a canal can both lower trade costs per ton of product and 
increase the number of tons that can be shipped per unit time. 
Both of these dimensions of efficiency, magnitude and speed, draw attention to the fact that 
market efficiency is a relative concept. Even if tests enable us to conclude that two markets 
are in spatial equilibrium and therefore efficient in a static sense
3
, it is only by comparing 
them with other pairs of markets that we can determine whether there is scope for increasing 
efficiency by lowering trade costs and/or increasing the rates at which price signals are 
transmitted between them. Hence, to assess the efficiency of a pair of markets we need 
benchmarks derived from the observation and analysis of other pairs.  
The magnitude and speed dimensions of market efficiency have important implications for 
policy. If we observe that it takes a certain number of weeks for prices on markets   and   to 
return to their long-run equilibrium following a shock, but several weeks longer on otherwise 
identical markets   and                            ‗   ?‘ P    p                      and   
are of worse quality than those between   and  ; perhaps market participants in   and   have 
access to better market information than participants in   and  ; perhaps a series of informal 
checkpoints on the route from   and   is impeding trade flows. If both pairs of markets are 
separated by international borders, then perhaps   and   are lagging   and   in the 
                                                             
3 Barrett (1996), Fackler and Goodwin (2001) and McNew and Fackler (1997) discuss the many challenges that complicate 
such tests. 
Estimating Dynamic Market Efficiency Frontiers 
35 
 
implementation of trade facilitation measures. Each of these causes suggests possible policy 
responses such as improving roads, establishing market information systems, eliminating 
informal checkpoints, or facilitating trade. Establishing empirical benchmarks and comparing 
dynamic market efficiency can help identify sources of impedance, design appropriate policy 
responses, and predict the benefits that these responses can generate. 
Several studies have taken first stabs at benchmarking market efficiency. All employ 
variations of a two-step procedure. In the first step, measures of the strength or speed of price 
transmission are estimated using the cointegration methods discussed above. In the second 
step, regression analysis with these estimates as dependent variables is used to explain 
variations in the strength or speed of price transmission.   
 Kouyaté et al. (2016) estimate ECMs of price transmission between pairs of rice 
markets in Western Africa in their first step. In their second-step regressions show that 
distance, common borders and common languages affect the likelihood of finding 
cointegration between individual pairs.  
 Kouyaté and von Cramon-Taubadel (2016) do not estimate own first-step measures of 
price transmission, but rather extract estimates for 1,189 pairs of cereal market from 
57 published studies. In their second-step regressions they find that geographic 
distance and international borders affect the strength and speed of price transmission.  
 Svanidze and Götz (2019a) use ECMs to estimate long-run elasticities of price 
transmission between wheat markets in Russia, and between corn markets in the US. 
In the second step of their analysis they compare the effects of factors such as 
geographic distance between markets, export volumes and production levels on 
elasticities of price transmission in Russia and the US.  
 Svanidze and Götz (2019b) also estimate price transmission parameters for Russian 
wheat and US corn markets in their first step. They do not carry out a second-step 
regression analysis, but instead compare boxplots of different estimated parameters for 
Russian wheat and US corn. They consider the US corn market to be a benchmark that 
         ―                      p   al market efficiency obtainable in an empirical 
       ‖              ―                                                      R         
                  p            US ‖ (S     z      G  z  2019   p  66)  
In this paper we propose a modification to the benchmarking procedure outlined above. 
Rather than using standard regression techniques in the second step to explain variation in 
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estimated measures of the strength and speed of price transmission, we estimate stochastic 
frontiers. Stochastic frontier methods have two advantages over the approaches employed to 
date. First, estimating a stochastic frontier establishes a within-sample benchmark for market 
                         p                            S     z      G  z‘  (2019   2019 ) 
comparisons of Russian wheat and US corn markets, and Kouyaté and von Cramon-
T       ‘  (2016)     -analysis of published price transmission coefficients generate 
interesting insights. However, they are based on comparison of boxplots and standard 
regression techniques that focus on explaining variation around mean measures of price 
transmission. Frontier analysis instead identifies the strongest and most rapid examples of 
price transmission that can be attained in a given setting, and attempts to explain why price 
transmission between markets is sometimes closer to or farther from this benchmark. In 
typical applications of stochastic frontier methods, production functions are estimated, and an 
                      ‘                                                            measure of 
its production inefficiency. In our application, the frontier represents the strongest or most 
rapid price transmission that is attainable between pairs of markets, and an individual market 
p   ‘                                                  a measure of its market inefficiency. 
Second, stochastic frontier methods provide a straightforward and intuitively appealing means 
of accounting for the fact that the measures of price transmission generated in the first step of 
the benchmarking procedure are estimates. Because they are estimates, some of the observed 
variation in these measures is due to sampling error, i.e. the difference between the true value 
of the parameter in question and the value estimated with the available sample of price data. If 
this sampling error is not constant across observations, the resulting heteroscedasticity can 
lead to inefficient estimation and misleading inference in the second step (Lewis and Linzer, 
2005). Intuitively, some of the first-step measures of price transmission are estimated more 
precisely than others and should therefore have a correspondingly greater influence on the 
results of the second-step of the procedure. Svanidze and Götz (2019a) employ bootstrapping 
techniques to address this issue; the other studies mentioned above ignore it. The stochastic 
frontier approach decomposes deviations from the frontier into two components; inefficiency 
and measurement error. As explained in section 2 below, we incorporate the standard errors of 
the first-step estimates of the strength and speed of price transmission directly into the 
measurement error component of our second-step estimation of the market efficiency frontier. 
We illustrate our proposed method using monthly data on pork prices on 30 provincial 
markets in China from 2000 to 2017. In the first step we use standard ECM methods to 
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estimate elasticities of price transmission as well as adjustment parameters that measure the 
speed of transmission between individual markets. In the second step we estimate frontiers for 
the elasticities and adjustment speeds using stochastic frontier techniques and covariates such 
as the geographic distance between the markets in question.  
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we outline the methods and the data 
that we use. In sections 3 and 4 we present and discuss results, respectively. Section 5 closes 
with conclusions and implications for future research.  
2 Methods, specification and data 
2.1 Methods 
The first step of our procedure is similar to that employed in the earlier studies outlined above 
(e.g. Svanidze and Götz, 2019a); we use the Johansen (1991; 1995) method to estimate the 
following bivariate VECM for pairs of pork prices in China:  
[
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In equation (1),     {        } index provinces in China. Estimation is carried out for the 
435 unique pairs of provinces for which    . The index   {         }  counts monthly 
price observations from January 2000 to December 2017. Since both prices are in logarithms, 
the coefficient        in the long-run equilibrium relationship  
                                                          +            +                     (2) 
is an estimate of the elasticity of price transmission from market   to market  . We normalise 
the long-run equilibrium relationship in equation (2) (and thus the error correction term 
[                            ] on the RHS of equation (1)) on the higher of the two prices, 
so that       is expected to be less than or equal to 1. The adjustment parameters ( ̂   ̂ ) in 
equation (1) measure how      and      change in period   in response to any disequilibrium 
                                 in the previous period    . The lag-length   in 
equation (1) is chosen using the Schwarz Bayesian Information Criteria (SBIC: Lütkepohl, 
1985; Lütkepohl 2005, pp. 156-157). 
This first-step estimation generates 435 estimates of the elasticity of price transmission ( ̂    ) 
and an equal number of estimated pairs of adjustment parameters ( ̂   ̂ ). As explained in the 
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following, we consider the estimated  ̂     to be measures of the relative magnitude of market 
efficiency defined above, and we use the estimated adjustment parameters ( ̂   ̂ )  to 
measures of the relative speed of restoring market efficiency.  
First consider the estimated elasticities of price transmission ( ̂    ) and the magnitude of 
market efficiency. The spatial equilibrium condition can be written as  
                                                         +                                             (3) 
where     represents the trade costs from market   to market  . The elasticity of price 
transmission between two markets that satisfy this condition,    
  , is defined as 
                                              
   
   





      
  
   
   
  
                                         (4) 
which can be interpreted as the cost share of the product in the lower-price location j in the 
price of the product in the higher-price location i.
4
 The higher the trade costs    , the lower the 
elasticity of price transmission between them. We assume that commodity trade costs are a 
function of the distance between two markets: 
                                                                         (   )                             (5) 
where     is the distance between markets   and  , and with 
       
    
     
Combining equations (4) and (5), we expect that the elasticity of price transmission between 
two markets is a decreasing function of the distance between them. Hence, we expect that 
 ̂    , which is an estimate of the elasticity    
  , will be a decreasing function of the distance 
between markets   and  . The stochastic frontier for  ̂     as a function of    , which we label 
     
∗ , defines for any given     the maximum elasticity of price transmission, and thus the 
minimum value of     that can be attained in the setting under consideration (such as pork 
markets in China). We therefore interpret deviations from the frontier      
∗  as deviations from 
                                                             
4 N                   G      ‘  (1975)                   p             sion. Moving a product in space can be viewed as a 
 p                  p                     p        G      ‘                    p               p                ‗p        ‘  nto 
a product at an import location by combining it in fixed proportions with a transportation input. In this case, the elasticity of 
input substitution between the export product and the transportation input equals 0, the supply of the transportation input will 
typically be price elastic, and the cost share of the transportation input in the price of the product at the import location will 
typically be low. Under these conditions the elasticity of price transmission will tend towards the cost share of the product in 
the export location in the price of the product in the import location (      G      ‘                     Kinnucan and Zhang, 
2015). 
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the maximum attainable magnitude of market efficiency. For example,  ̂     for a specific pair 
of markets   and   separated by distance     might lie below the frontier      
∗  at     because 
    between the two markets is higher than it could be based on the evidence provided by the 
full set of  ̂     for all available market pairs. 
Next consider the estimated adjustment parameters ( ̂   ̂ ) and the speed of restoring market 
efficiency. In equation (1),    is expected to be less than zero and    is expected to be greater 
than zero to ensure error correction, i.e. to ensure that prices tend to return to equilibrium 
following a shock. We therefore calculate  ̂    ̂   ̂  as a measure of the total speed of 
price transmission between markets   and  .  ̂  , which is expected to lie between 0 and 1, 
measures the proportion of any disequilibrium that is corrected per period. We assume that the 
speed of price transmission between two markets is, like the elasticity of price transmission, a 
decreasing function of the distance between them: 
                                                               ̂    (   )                                         (6) 
with 
       
    
     
The stochastic frontier for  ̂   as a function of    , which we label    
∗ , defines for any given 
    the maximum speed of price transmission that can be attained in the setting under 
consideration, and we interpret deviations from this frontier as deviations from the maximum 
attainable speed of restoring market efficiency.  
In the second step of our procedure we estimate stochastic frontier models for  ̂     and  ̂  . 
For the magnitude of market efficiency we estimate  
                                                                    ̂        +              (7a) 
where    is a vector of variables that are expected to influence the magnitude of market 
efficiency, such as the distance     between the markets in question, and   is a vector of 
parameters to be estimated. Similarly, for the speed of restoring market efficiency we estimate 
                                                                ̂      +                                      (7b) 
where    is a vector of variables that are expected to influence the speed of market efficiency, 
and   is a vector of parameters to be estimated. The two-sided error terms     and     
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   and             
      (8) 
capture random factors such as measurement error. Since the dependent variables  ̂     and  ̂   
are estimated,     and     are heteroscedastic. Failure to account for this will lead to 
inconsistent estimation of the models in equation (7a) and (7b) and invalid inference (Hadri, 
1999). We therefore model this heteroscedasticity as 
                                                    
            and     
                                       (9) 
In equation (9),     and     are vectors that include an intercept term and the estimated 
standard errors (  ̂ ̂    and  ̂ ̂  , respectively) of the estimated   ̂     and  ̂   .   and   are 
vectors of parameters to be estimated. While the estimated standard errors  ̂ ̂     of the  ̂     
are a direct by-product of the estimation of the VECM in equation (1) in the first step of our 
procedure, we need to calculate the estimated standard errors  ̂ ̂   of the  ̂   using:
5
 
                                                 ̂ ̂   √ ̂ ̂ 
 +  ̂ ̂ 
      ̂  ̂   ̂        (10) 
The one-sided error terms     and     
                                                        
      
   and      
      
                           (11) 
are assumed to be uncorrelated with     and    , respectively.       (     ) indicates that 
the market pair  ,   attains the frontier magnitude (speed) of market efficiency, and       
(     ) correspondingly measures inefficiency.  
2.2 Specification 
In our empirical application the markets   and   are provinces in China. As mentioned above, 
we include the distance     between markets   and   in the vectors    and    in the frontier 
models (7a) and (7b), respectively. We expect that the frontier magnitude and speed of 
restoring market efficiency will both fall as     increases.  
                                                             
5 S             ‗estat vce‘ (S      2020)                p             -covariance matrix for the estimated parameters of a 
VECM including the estimate of      ̂   ̂   that is required in equation (10). 
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In addition, we include a dummy variable     that equals 1 if markets   and   share a common 
border. If borders between provinces in China impede pork trade in any manner, then all other 
things being equal we would expect higher magnitudes and speeds of market efficiency to be 
attained between markets that share a common border. Ideally we would also include a 
variable that measures the volume of pork trade between markets   and   in the frontier 
models (7a) and (7b). It is conceivable that especially the speed of price transmission between 
two markets could be a positive function of the volume of trade between them. However, data 
on intra-Chinese pork trade are not available.  
As explained above, we include the estimated standard errors of  ̂     and  ̂   ( ̂ ̂     and  ̂ ̂  ) 
in the vectors      and    to account for heteroscedasticity in the error terms     and    , 
respectively. We include province dummies in the one-sided inefficiency terms     and     to 
capture province-specific effects such as differences in the quality of infrastructure or cultural 
differences (for example, in some provinces a large proportion of the population is Muslim).  
2.3 Data 
We estimate the bivariate VECMs in equation (1) with logarithms of monthly pork prices in 
Yuan/kg from 30 provinces in China from January 2000 to December 2017 (Ministry of 
Agriculture of China, 2001-2018). The provincial monthly averages are based on weekly 
observations monitored by the Ministry of Agriculture of China at hundreds of markets in all 
provinces of China except Tibet. The price series could be extended up to and including 2020, 
but the outbreak of African Swine Fever in late 2018 and more recently the Covid-19 
pandemic have led to major disruptions on the supply and demand sides of Chinese pork 
markets that will have affected market integration and would confound our analysis (Ma et al., 
2020). Hence, we forego more recent observations to avoid the risk of structural breaks in the 
price relations that we study. Figure 1 presents several typical pork price series selected from 
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Figure 1 Three typical Chinese pork price series (monthly data from Jan. 2000 to Dec. 
2017) 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture of China (2001-2018). 
3 Results 
For each of the 30 price series individually the ADF test (Said and Dickey, 1984) fails to 
reject the null hypothesis that the series is I(1), but rejects this null hypothesis for first 
differences of the prices. In addition, the pCADF test, a panel unit root test that combines p-
values from covariate ADF tests (Constantini and Lupi, 2013), fails to reject the null 
  p                                   I(1)  J       ‘  (1991; 1995) trace test for cointegration 
indicates that the null of no cointegration is rejected for 423 price pairs at the 1% level of 
significance, and for another 11 price pairs at the 5% level; only in one of the 435 price pairs 
is the null hypothesis of no cointegration not rejected at conventional levels of significance.
6
 
First step: W                435           VE M        J       ‘  (1991  1995)         
likelihood method. In 385 of 435 cases (89%) the SBIC criterion selects the lag-length    ; 
in the remaining cases     (3%) or     (8%). Figure 2 presents the distribution of the 435 
estimated elasticities of long-run price transmission ( ̂    ) and descriptive statistics; similarly, 
                                                             
6 Results of the ADF, pCADF and Johansen test are in Appendix. 
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Figure 3 presents the distribution of the estimated speeds of price transmission ( ̂  ). In Figure 
2 we see that more than half of the estimated elasticities of price transmission are greater than 
0.9. The results depicted in Figure 3 reveal that the median speed of price transmission is 
roughly 0.3, which indicates that for half of the 435 market pairs at least 30% of any deviation 
from long-run equilibrium is corrected within one month. For the great majority of market 
pairs, between 15 and 50% of any deviation is corrected within one month. 
Figure 2: Distribution of the estimated price transmission elasticities   ̂      
 
Source: Own calculations using Ministry of Agriculture of China (2001-2018). 
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Figure 3: Distribution of the estimated speeds of price transmission   ̂    
 
Source: Own calculations using Ministry of Agriculture of China (2001-2018). 
Second step: Table 1 presents the estimation results of the frontier model for the magnitude of 
market efficiency (equation (7a), dependent variable  ̂    ). According to these results, the 
frontier  ̂     falls by 0.015 per 1000 km of distance between two markets. Sharing a common 
border has unexpected negative but insignificant effect on the magnitude of market efficiency, 
and omitting the common border dummy variable has no notable effects on the remaining 
results. 
As expected, the estimated standard errors of the estimates of  ̂     from the first step of the 
analysis ( ̂ ̂    ) have a significant positive influence on the variance of the random error     
(    
 ). Furthermore, there are significant province effects in the variance     
  of the one-sided 
inefficiency term    . We have omitted the dummy for the province Heilongjiang in the 
estimation; all other province dummies have positive effects on the variance of the 
inefficiency term (increasing from the top to the bottom of the list in Table 1). This indicates 
that the variance of the inefficiency term is higher for market pairs that include these other 
provinces. In some cases (e.g. Jilin and Liaoning at the top of the list) the estimated additional 
variance relative to Heilongjiang is small and insignificant; moving down the list it becomes 
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larger, and from Jiangsu province onward it is statistically significant at the 5% level. This 
ranking of the 30 provinces according to the variance of the inefficiency term     is not 
identical but very similar to the ranking of the provinces according to their average market 
             (               ); Sp      ‘                                                      
0.9919, and the provinces near the top (bottom) of the list in Table 1 are also the provinces 
that attain the highest (lowest) average magnitudes of market efficiency. 
Table 1 Estimated magnitude of market efficiency frontier (equation (7a), dependent 











frontier (   ) 
Constant 0.992 0.0058 171.23 0.981 1.004 
    -0.015 0.0029 -5.23 -0.021 -0.010 
    -0.005 0.0053 -0.95 -0.016 0.005 
Random error 
    
            
Constant -8.028 0.302 -26.59 -8.620 -7.437 
 ̂ ̂     21.123 8.844 2.39 3.790 38.462 
Inefficiency term   
    
  
Constant -9.241 0.870 -10.62 -10.946 -7.535 
Jilin 0.002 0.557 0.000 -1.089 1.093 
Liaoning 0.255 0.530 0.480 -0.783 1.293 
Tianjin 0.536 0.546 0.980 -0.535 1.607 
Beijing 0.537 0.564 0.950 -0.569 1.643 
Shandong 0.540 0.542 1.000 -0.522 1.602 
Zhejiang 0.620 0.532 1.170 -0.423 1.663 
Shanxi 0.657 0.541 1.210 -0.404 1.718 
Inner Mongolia 0.745 0.542 1.370 -0.318 1.808 
Chongqing 0.788 0.537 1.470 -0.265 1.841 
Hunan 0.843 0.533 1.580 -0.203 1.888 
Henan 0.854 0.541 1.580 -0.206 1.914 
Hebei 1.040 0.554 1.880 -0.045 2.125 
Jiangsu 1.276 0.545 2.340 0.207 2.344 
Jiangxi 1.364 0.543 2.510 0.299 2.429 
Hubei 1.802 0.546 3.300 0.731 2.872 
Gansu 1.875 0.534 3.510 0.829 2.921 
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Guangxi 2.074 0.529 3.920 1.038 3.110 
Shaanxi 2.141 0.537 3.990 1.089 3.192 
Qinghai 2.154 0.535 4.030 1.105 3.202 
Xinjiang 2.178 0.548 3.970 1.103 3.252 
Sichuan 2.280 0.530 4.300 1.241 3.318 
Anhui 2.359 0.543 4.350 1.295 3.423 
Hainan 2.543 0.529 4.810 1.507 3.580 
Guizhou 2.949 0.523 5.640 1.924 3.975 
Fujian 3.000 0.532 5.640 1.957 4.043 
Yunnan 3.044 0.518 5.880 2.029 4.058 
Guangdong 3.864 0.547 7.060 2.791 4.937 
Shanghai 4.098 0.556 7.370 3.008 5.189 
Ningxia 4.101 0.549 7.470 3.024 5.177 
Source: Own calculations with Stata (2020) „frontier‟ command.   
Figure 4 presents a scatterplot of the 435 estimates of  ̂     against distance     as well as the 
estimated magnitude of market efficiency frontier based on the results in Table 1. In Figure 4 
we highlight all of the market pairs that include Heilongjiang (the most efficient province) as 
well as all of the market pairs that include Ningxia (the least efficient province). It is readily 
apparent that the individual  ̂     are on average farther from the frontier for market pairs that 
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Figure 4 The estimated magnitude of market efficiency frontier and observed  ̂     
 
Source: Own calculations using Ministry of Agriculture of China (2001-2018) and Suzhou Dongchen Refrigerated Logistics 
Company (2019). 
Figure 4 also includes a theoretical frontier that we have calculated using equation (4) and 
estimates of transport costs for pork between different regions of China provided by a Chinese 
transportation company.
7
 We see that the estimated frontier lies just slightly below the 
theoretical frontier based on these transport costs. This provides some support for the validity 
of the estimated frontier and suggests that transport accounts for most of the total costs of 
pork trade between provinces in China. We also see that the estimated frontier differs 
considerably from the OLS estimate of   ̂     on distance that has been used in past studies 
(e.g. Kouyaté et al., 2016; Svanidze and Götz, 2019a). 
Table 2 presents the estimation results of the frontier model for the speed of restoring market 
efficiency (equation (7b), dependent variable  ̂  ). According to these results, the frontier of 
                                                             
7 Fixed and variable transport costs for pork between selected pairs of market in China were provided by the Suzhou 
Dongchen Refrigerated Logistics Company (2019) as showed in Appendix (Figure A.1). Based on these costs and using 
equation (4) (   
     
   
  
) we calculated a theoretical long-run elasticity of price transmission for each market pair as the 
cost share of pork in the lower-price province   in the price of pork in the higher-price province  . 
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 ̂   falls by 0.014 per 1000 km of distance between two markets, i.e. the proportion of a 
deviation from long-run equilibrium that is corrected per month falls by 1.4 percentage points 
for each additional 1000 km of distance. Sharing a common border has the expected positive 
effect on the speed of market efficiency, but this effect is insignificant and omitting the 
common border dummy has no notable effects on the remaining results. 
Table 2 Estimated speed of market efficiency frontier (equation (7b), dependent variable 












(   ) 
Constant 0.336 0.0149 22.46 0.306 0.365 
    -0.014 0.0067 -2.12 -0.027 -0.001 
    0.010 0.0150 0.69 -0.019 0.040 
Random error 
    
            
Constant -11.057 1.165 -9.49 -13.339 -8.774 






















Source: Own calculations with Stata (2020) „frontier‟ command.   
As expected, the estimated standard errors of the estimates of  ̂   from the first step of the 
analysis ( ̂ ̂  ) have a significant positive influence on the variance of the random error     
(    
 ). We find that only the dummy for the province Xinjiang in the far West of China has 
significant effects on the variance   
  of the one-sided inefficiency term    . We also find that 
the estimated inefficiency ( ̂  ) from the frontier model for  ̂     has a significant effect on the 
variance of the inefficiency term    . This result provides some evidence that unobserved 
factors that reduce the magnitude of market efficiency also reduce the speed of restoring 
market efficiency.  
Figure 5 presents a scatterplot of the 435 estimates of  ̂   against distance    , as well as the 
estimated frontier based on the results in Table 2. The market pairs that involve Xinjiang are 
highlighted. We see that for many market pairs the observed  ̂   lie sometimes well above the 
estimated frontier. This suggests that a large proportion of the deviations from the frontier can 
be attributed to random error variance, i.e. uncertainty about the first-step estimates of  ̂  . 
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This is reflected in the large value (106.1) of the coefficient for the estimated standard error of 
 ̂   ( ̂ ̂    reported in Table 2.  
Figure 5 highlights the fact that while the estimated effect of distance on the speed of 
restoring market efficiency is significant, it is small in magnitude. The OLS estimate of the 
relationship between  ̂   and distance     is considerably steeper, but this estimate does not 
account for the standard errors of the estimated  ̂  , and it appears to be influenced by the 
market pairs that involve the province Xinjiang. Note that in Figure 5 we do not include a 
theoretical frontier for  ̂   as we did for  ̂     in Figure 4. We derived the theoretical frontier 
for  ̂     from the spatial equilibrium condition (equations (3) and (4)) and calculated it using 
information on transport costs for pork in China. However, there is no equivalent theoretical 
foundation for deriving a frontier for  ̂  , as the speed of price transmission depends on a 
complex set of logistic factors such as transport capacities and speeds, and the time it takes to 
initiate and execute transactions. 
Figure 5 The estimated speed of restoring market efficiency frontier and observed  ̂   
   
Source: Own calculations using Ministry of Agriculture of China (2001-2018). 
4 Discussion 
The results reported above for the magnitude of market efficiency and for the speed of 
restoring market efficiency differ from one another in several respects. Figure 6 presents the 
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distributions of the estimated inefficiencies for the magnitude of market efficiency (i.e. how 
far are the observed  ̂     from the corresponding frontier estimates      
∗ ) and for the speed of 
restoring market efficiency (i.e. how far are the observed  ̂   from the corresponding frontier 
estimates    
∗ ). Consider first the speed of restoring market efficiency. For over one-half of the 
market pairs deviations from efficiency are corrected by 0.03-0.05 (3 to 5 percentage points) 
per month less than is attained by the market pairs that define the frontier. However, the 
distribution is skewed, and the average inefficiency for all market pairs is 5.5%. Detailed 
results reveal that the average inefficiency for the 29 market pairs that include Xinjiang is 
13.9% compared with 4.9% for the other 406 market pairs. Hence, market pairs that include 
Xinjiang are on average 9 percentage points farther from the frontier, which means that on 
average deviations from long-run equilibrium are corrected by 9% less per month for market 
pairs that include Xinjiang than for all other market pairs. Xinjiang is located in the far West 
of China and it could be that travel and trade restrictions that apply to Xinjiang are slowing 
price transmission and the restoration of equilibrium between that province and the rest of the 
country.   
Figure 6 Distributions of inefficiency for the magnitude and the speed of market 
efficiency 
 
  Source: Own calculations using Ministry of Agriculture of China (2001-2018). 
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In comparison, the distribution of the inefficiency scores for the magnitude of market 
efficiency in Figure 6 shows that for many market pairs the long-run elasticity of price 
transmission is within 0.03 (3%) of the frontier. The average inefficiency is 5.9%. As 
presented above (Table 1), we find significant province effects in these inefficiency scores.  
Figure 7 Regional differences in the magnitude of pork market efficiency in China 
 
                                            
                                                        
Source: Own calculations. 
To illustrate these effects, in Figure 7 each province is shaded according to the average 
market efficiency of the pairs in which it is included. We see that market pairs involving 
provinces located in the Northeast of China are characterised by the highest magnitude of 
market efficiency, and that the magnitude of market efficiency tends to be lower for provinces 
located farther to the South and West. Provinces with lower levels of market efficiency 
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include Shanghai, Guangdong and Fujian; perhaps imports of pork from outside of China are 
affecting prices in these border provinces. Ningxia in western China also stands out, as do 
Yunnan and Guizhou; factors such as ethnicity and dietary customs (for example the 
relatively high proportion of Hui Muslims in Ningxia) and relative remoteness might 
contribute to these results. 
5 Conclusions and suggestions for future research 
We propose a new method for benchmarking dynamic market efficiency using cointegration 
analysis coupled with frontier estimation methods. The use of frontier methods allows us to 
estimate within-sample benchmarks for the magnitude and the speed of restoring market 
efficiency. It also provides a convenient way of accounting for sampling error in estimated 
measures of price transmission. An empirical application to the example of pork markets in 
China demonstrates that the method is feasible and produces plausible results that allow for a 
richer interpretation than past attempts based on OLS regression. 
Several limitations and open questions could be addressed in future research. First, in our 
application to pork markets in China we are unable to address the question of how physical 
trade flows affect market efficiency, because data on trade between provinces in China are not 
available. Physical trade is not a necessary condition for market integration, as information 
flows can also play a role (Stephens et al., 2012). Nevertheless, it is reasonable to hypothesise 
that trade flows have an influence. Future research could apply the methods outlined in this 
paper to settings, for example the EU, in which appropriate trade data are available. 
Second, we analyse factors that affect variation in market efficiency within China, but we are 
not able to identify whether there are factors specific to China as a whole that make its pork 
markets more or less efficient than pork markets in other countries. The frontier method that 
we propose could be extended using meta-                    (B               2004; O‘D       
et al., 2008) to simultaneously estimate within- and between-country benchmarks and thus 
investigate whether there are indications that markets in some countries are systematically 
more or less efficient than markets in others.  
Finally, in our empirical application we assume that the elasticities and adjustment parameters 
that describe pork price transmission between provinces in China have been constant over the 
2000-2017 sample period. China has experienced rapid economic growth and restructuring 
over this period, which has led to shifts in regional pork supply and demand as well as 
changes in trade infrastructure. As a result, the elasticities and adjustment parameters that we 
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estimate and analyse may have changed over the sample period. To avoid what are likely 
major structural breaks on Chinese pork markets due to the African Swine Fever outbreak and 
COVID-19 in China, we carried out our empirical application without data from 2018 onward. 
But structural breaks and other sources of non-constant parameters may also affect the earlier 
years that we do analyse. Future applications could use time-varying ECM estimation 
techniques (Adämmer and Bohl, 2015, 2018) to generate time series of varying error 
correction parameters for each market pair in the first step. In the second step, panel frontier 
techniques (e.g. Kumbhakar, 1990) could then be applied to study how the market efficiency 
frontier has shifted over time, and what factors have influenced the evolution of efficiency in 
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Appendix of Chapter III  
Markets analyzed in question are listed as follows: 
Table A.1: List of markets in China 
 
            Interprovincial analysis  
                      China 
No Province Capital  
1 Beijing  Municipality  
2 Tianjin Municipality  
3 Hebei  Shijiazhuang  
4 Shanxi Taiyuan  
5 Inner Mongolia Huhhot  
6 Liaoning Shenyang  
7 Jilin Changchun  
8 Heilongjinag Harbin  
9 Shanghai Municipality  
10 Jiangsu Nanjing  
11 Zhejiang Hangzhou  
12 Anhui Hefei  
13 Fujian Fuzhou  
14 Jiangxi Nanchang  
15 Shandong Jinan  
16 Henan Zhengzhou  
17 Hubei Wuhan  
18 Hunan Changsha  
19 Guangdong Canton  
20 Guangxi Nanning  
21 Hainan Haikou  
22 Chongqing Municipality  
23 Sichuan Chengdu  
24 Guizhou Guiyang  
25 Yunnan Kunming  
26 Shaanxi Xi‘    
27 Gansu Lanzhou  
28 Qinghai Xining  
29 Ningxia Yinchuan  
30 Xinjiang Urumqi  
 
Pork prices and Distance  
 
Pork prices (Yuan/kg) are from the Ministry of Agriculture of China. Source: 
http://www.moa.gov.cn/ 
Road distance (1 000 kilometers) between markets   and  ; calculated as road distance 
between capitals of provinces. Source: https://map.baidu.com/ 
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Table A.2.1: ADF test for prices in levels 
 
  Test statistics   
 Price level Lags None Constant Const & trend 
 Beijing 2 0.716 -1.880 -3.141 
 Tianjin 1 0.850 -1.634 -2.897 
 Hebei 4 0.805 -1.691 -2.607 
 Shanxi 3 0.739 -1.898 -3.017 
 Inner Mongolia 2 0.826 -1.847 -2.998 
 Liaoning 4 0.909 -1.707 -2.551 
 Jilin 4 0.940 -1.979 -2.876 
 Heilongjiang 3 0.631 -1.747 -3.187 
 Shanghai 2 0.762 -1.320 -2.878 
 Jiangsu 3 0.894 -1.591 -2.957 
 Zhejiang 2 0.941 -1.447 -2.930 
 Anhui 2 0.637 -1.641 -3.237 
 Fujian 2 0.749 -1.299 -3.038 
 Jiangxi 2 0.769 -1.505 -2.929 
 Shandong 4 0.955 -1.479 -2.686 
 Henan 2 0.726 -1.568 -2.787 
 Hubei 3 0.861 -1.408 -2.500 
 Hunan 3 0.853 -1.438 -2.621 
 Guangdong 2 0.866 -1.177 -2.727 
 Guangxi 3 0.820 -1.395 -2.284 
 Hainan 1 0.996 -0.714 -2.928 
 Chongqing 2 0.620 -1.739 -3.295 
 Sichuan 3 0.884 -1.509 -2.714 
 Guizhou 3 1.024 -1.358 -2.651 
 Yunnan 2 0.962 -1.330 -2.622 
 Shaanxi 2 0.505 -1.501 -3.269 
 Gansu 2 0.928 -1.824 -3.029 
 Qinghai 1 0.799 -1.487 -2.691 
 Ningxia 1 0.720 -1.863 -3.124 
 Xinjiang 2 0.896 -1.837 -2.980 
 
Note: a) Number of lags is chosen by SBIC criterion. b) ADF test (no constant, no trend): -2.58 (1 %), -1.95 (5 %), -1.62 
(10%); ADF test with constant:-3.46 (1%), -2.88 (5%), -2.57 (10%); ADF test with constant and trend: -3.99 (1%), -3.43 
(5%), -3.13 (10%). 
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Table A.2.2: ADF test for prices in first differences 
 
  Test statistics   
 Price difference Lags None Constant Const & trend 
 ΔB  j    1 -9.784 -9.832 -9.831  
ΔT   j   1 -10.435 -10.519 -10.532  
ΔH     3 -7.954 -8.022 -8.032  
ΔS      2 -8.668 -8.726 -8.738  
ΔI     M        1 -9.128 -9.197 -9.208  
ΔL        3 -8.291 -8.377 -8.396  
ΔJ     3 -8.344 -8.442 -8.480  
ΔH      j   g 2 -8.224 -8.267 -8.260  
ΔS        1 -9.252 -9.292 -9.271  
ΔJ       2 -8.078 -8.155 -8.148  
ΔZ  j     1 -8.626 -8.706 -8.695  
Δ      1 -8.798 -8.832 -8.817  
ΔF j    1 -8.910 -8.952 -8.931  
ΔJ       1 -8.961 -9.010 -8.997  
ΔS        3 -7.955 -8.046 -8.043  
ΔH     1 -9.064 -9.110 -9.101  
ΔH     2 -8.617 -8.681 -8.673  
ΔH     2 -8.066 -8.136 -8.128  
ΔG         2 -7.562 -7.630 -7.611  
ΔG       2 -8.461 -8.519 -8.512  
ΔH      1 -10.137 -10.188 -10.176  
Δ          1 -8.863 -8.899 -8.887  
ΔS       2 -7.944 -8.025 -8.024  
ΔG  z    2 -7.571 -7.681 -7.679  
ΔY      1 -7.819 -7.911 -7.897  
ΔS       1 -9.870 -9.885 -9.864  
ΔG     1 -9.145 -9.230 -9.236  
ΔQ       1 -9.845 -9.893 -9.884  
ΔN       2 -10.031 -10.113 -10.124  
ΔX  j     1 -9.506 -9.577 -9.585  
Note: a) Number of lags is chosen by SBIC criterion. b) Critical values for ADF test (no constant, no trend): -2.58 (1 %), -
1.95 (5 %), -1.62 (10%); ADF test (with constant): -3.46 (1%), -2.88 (5%), -2.57 (10%); ADF test (with constant and trend): -
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Table A.3: PCADF test results 
Note: Choi (2001). 
Price level 
 
Price difference level 
Province  P.value  Lag   ΔP         P.value  Lag 
Beijing 0.282 1 
 
ΔB  j    1.00E-16 0 
Tianjin 0.413 0 
 
ΔT   j   1.00E-16 0 
Hebei 0.456 3 
 
ΔH     2.01E-15 2 
Shanxi 0.342 2 
 
ΔS      2.15E-15 1 
Inner Mongolia 0.192 1 
 
ΔI     M        1.00E-16 0 
Liaoning 0.429 3 
 
ΔL        9.05E-15 2 
Jilin 0.380 3 
 
ΔJ     7.12E-15 2 
Heilongjiang 0.307 2 
 
ΔH      j     1.90E-15 1 
Shanghai 0.574 1 
 
ΔS        1.00E-16 0 
Jiangsu 0.508 2 
 
ΔJ       1.33E-14 1 
Zhejiang 0.447 1 
 
ΔZ  j     3.10E-14 0 
Anhui 0.361 1 
 
Δ      1.00E-16 0 
Fujian 0.647 1 
 
ΔF j    1.00E-16 0 
Jiangxi 0.486 1 
 
ΔJ       1.00E-16 0 
Shandong 0.484 3 
 
ΔS        2.14E-15 2 
Henan 0.357 1 
 
ΔH     2.17E-14 0 
Hubei 0.515 2 
 
ΔH     9.08E-15 1 
Hunan 0.549 2 
 
ΔH     5.01E-14 1 
Guangdong 0.555 1 
 
ΔG         1.70E-13 1 
Guangxi 0.570 2 
 
ΔG       1.81E-14 1 
Hainan 0.691 0 
 
ΔH      1.00E-16 0 
Chongqing 0.342 1 
 
Δ          3.81E-15 0 
Sichuan 0.426 2 
 
ΔS       1.92E-12 1 
Guizhou 0.624 2 
 
ΔG  z    1.27E-15 1 
Yunnan 0.492 1 
 
ΔY      6.46E-12 0 
Shaanxi 0.304 1 
 
ΔS       1.00E-16 0 
Gansu 0.408 1 
 
ΔG     1.00E-16 0 
Qinghai 0.465 0 
 
ΔQ       1.00E-16 0 
Ningxia 0.220 0 
 
ΔN       1.00E-16 1 







 test statistic: -0.856 
  
-43.028 
 p-value:   0.196     0  
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Table A.4.1 Results of the Johansen trace tests for cointegration (H0: r=0) 
Beijing 
                             
Tianjin 40.71 
                            
Hebei 28.08 43.78 
                           
Shanxi 27.44 39.17 45.05 
                          
Inner 34.54 49.79 39.83 37.75 
                         
Liaoning 29.16 43.89 42.09 31.54 59.56 
                        
Jilin 33.79 56.44 34.59 20.11 37.10 34.06 
                       
Hei 35.95 50.57 36.92 31.83 54.21 37.81 46.65 
                      
Shanghai 25.73 27.22 30.16 36.81 28.23 34.38 32.87 28.47 
                     
Jiangsu 24.07 37.07 33.64 53.74 22.92 31.41 35.37 29.83 27.92 
                    
Zhejiang 23.28 27.83 36.61 55.62 23.94 42.10 42.79 34.38 24.25 39.94 
                   
Anhui 30.26 31.01 51.09 65.86 31.03 51.55 43.10 39.05 36.17 41.62 40.81 
                  
Fujian 26.35 32.53 34.70 45.09 24.57 42.10 40.84 32.96 18.65 37.90 24.28 38.88 
                 
Jiangxi 26.17 34.36 45.73 48.96 31.14 52.65 44.82 41.30 32.80 34.02 33.83 49.35 22.62 
                
Shandong 27.92 42.53 30.42 42.52 40.64 31.52 34.16 33.73 28.00 51.97 37.49 39.88 37.89 36.40 
               
Henan 22.53 28.69 54.03 72.89 22.88 43.75 37.15 30.94 23.99 32.71 24.03 67.76 26.16 42.52 27.19 
              
Hubei 29.86 40.77 49.47 50.85 39.24 60.70 46.95 47.93 31.43 29.37 25.84 48.43 23.25 43.44 38.07 42.53 
             
Hunan 24.41 28.40 42.58 54.60 24.50 42.99 38.48 35.79 29.78 32.64 35.72 56.95 33.01 43.16 34.53 50.55 33.93 
            
Guangdong 21.01 30.26 33.04 41.57 22.87 40.95 38.32 35.62 19.85 33.79 21.46 37.88 33.88 25.35 33.32 23.00 25.89 32.56 
           
Guangxi 21.47 32.92 33.01 34.48 23.85 35.63 34.15 32.83 24.16 25.51 22.81 40.39 22.28 34.99 24.45 30.87 27.63 44.73 22.07 
          
Hainan 25.17 26.57 29.91 36.73 22.64 36.46 37.40 30.53 22.91 33.39 24.43 27.74 19.35 24.48 30.75 21.96 23.38 25.19 15.06 18.48 
         
Chongqing 31.86 51.46 37.59 40.02 44.08 58.21 58.39 56.15 27.59 27.97 27.74 30.83 24.97 29.58 38.59 31.97 31.60 23.62 27.13 29.95 25.20 
        
Sichuan 22.79 34.96 30.95 37.37 32.10 55.90 47.18 51.46 21.12 22.98 22.68 29.67 18.73 26.27 31.67 26.06 18.07 20.80 21.85 23.40 20.19 42.53 
       
Guizhou 35.46 43.26 35.37 44.55 39.67 49.83 51.95 49.52 32.94 44.05 40.04 38.13 27.07 31.77 45.98 33.32 38.34 28.01 28.77 24.49 21.58 40.88 34.92 
      
Yunnan 40.16 20.11 45.14 51.86 45.05 65.97 63.85 53.64 30.99 39.55 33.21 36.46 24.03 33.28 59.38 31.98 43.03 32.33 20.80 25.59 21.98 45.73 39.40 53.18 
     
Shaanxi 34.99 45.74 40.46 46.73 58.13 60.91 62.54 70.76 34.64 47.16 34.72 36.91 26.57 40.01 47.28 37.50 47.34 32.63 26.25 27.35 20.23 46.12 53.17 58.25 70.73 
    
Gansu 39.99 52.07 46.86 43.20 44.65 65.85 54.38 54.35 35.03 30.59 23.40 40.59 29.65 40.10 50.23 28.41 42.14 28.54 31.19 30.45 24.09 35.42 37.06 44.77 40.54 41.28 
   
Qinghai 32.13 38.71 44.19 43.15 48.74 54.92 45.62 47.27 28.96 37.62 28.93 45.75 24.15 36.07 43.27 35.68 45.26 33.57 29.39 31.53 19.68 47.55 47.64 49.01 42.90 44.44 60.33 
  
Ningxia 32.16 31.28 34.84 29.11 41.50 43.27 31.71 41.07 34.11 22.68 38.96 39.87 27.32 38.30 43.37 34.67 28.62 39.64 31.26 29.43 31.08 44.46 48.43 40.27 55.11 57.53 42.79 44.32 
 
Xinjiang 37.47 37.07 26.58 24.69 26.81 27.48 33.26 31.49 25.36 24.93 20.70 20.59 21.60 21.32 26.94 22.70 23.06 18.64 22.06 18.97 26.93 27.71 22.23 20.09 31.88 32.22 28.98 26.65 24.12 
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Table A.4.2 Results of the Johansen trace tests for cointegration (H0: r=1) 
Beijing 
                             
Tianjin 3.98 
                            
Hebei 4.49 4.13                            
Shanxi 5.21 4.84 4.91                           
Inner 3.86 4.16 3.71 4.47                          
Liaoning 5.67 5.17 5.75 5.72 4.76                         
Jilin 5.07 5.45 4.73 3.50 3.70 5.21                        
Hei 4.72 4.66 4.74 5.82 4.45 6.06 6.59                       
Shanghai 3.14 3.19 2.85 3.10 3.15 3.17 2.97 3.03                      
Jiangsu 4.81 5.20 3.54 3.82 2.67 3.20 3.24 3.65 4.72                     
Zhejiang 2.97 2.91 2.62 2.35 2.74 2.45 2.34 2.44 3.48 3.50                    
Anhui 3.35 3.31 3.38 3.85 3.40 4.14 3.87 3.65 3.25 4.85 3.14                   
Fujian 2.10 2.23 1.94 2.32 2.34 2.34 2.12 2.14 2.38 3.50 3.26 2.44                  
Jiangxi 2.78 2.95 2.60 2.63 3.13 2.94 2.91 2.97 3.18 4.81 3.37 2.82 2.35                 
Shandong 4.18 3.98 3.98 4.40 3.69 3.28 3.82 4.42 3.26 4.15 2.43 3.58 2.29 2.80                
Henan 3.57 3.67 2.77 2.79 3.58 2.87 2.44 2.95 3.50 4.60 3.08 3.70 2.70 3.44 2.80               
Hubei 3.40 3.55 2.99 2.86 3.65 3.31 3.11 3.41 3.28 5.00 3.13 3.31 2.48 3.10 3.11 3.75              
Hunan 3.12 3.33 2.82 2.56 2.68 2.71 2.70 2.97 4.10 2.94 3.58 3.48 3.31 3.87 2.87 3.62 3.90             
Guangdong 2.18 2.77 2.06 2.46 2.56 2.37 2.32 2.48 2.67 3.87 3.18 2.77 2.48 2.82 2.42 2.67 2.65 3.74            
Guangxi 3.26 2.41 2.71 2.11 2.27 1.79 2.65 1.86 3.80 4.34 3.39 3.29 2.95 3.33 2.89 2.60 2.72 3.76 3.00           
Hainan 1.73 2.03 1.67 1.94 1.89 2.08 2.03 2.01 1.98 2.76 2.24 1.91 1.84 2.05 1.82 1.93 1.78 2.16 1.85 1.95          
Chongqing 3.27 4.31 3.20 3.77 3.64 3.80 3.99 3.65 3.12 5.34 3.50 3.24 2.29 2.90 3.39 3.66 3.53 4.05 2.49 3.57 1.73         
Sichuan 3.22 3.38 2.74 2.97 3.34 3.18 3.02 3.16 3.39 4.60 3.33 3.16 2.70 3.16 3.01 3.53 3.37 3.66 2.98 3.40 1.78 3.38        
Guizhou 3.20 3.41 3.03 3.37 3.15 3.65 3.97 3.46 3.35 5.19 3.36 2.78 2.62 3.50 3.20 3.64 3.09 3.32 3.23 3.18 2.78 3.14 3.64       
Yunnan 2.10 3.50 1.98 2.17 1.86 2.38 2.47 2.33 2.40 3.49 2.62 1.85 1.98 1.99 2.16 2.37 1.98 2.32 2.08 2.02 1.78 1.82 1.69 2.28      
Shaanxi 3.45 3.39 3.62 4.56 3.48 4.70 4.62 4.10 3.07 5.18 3.25 3.13 2.34 2.86 3.55 3.77 3.39 3.51 2.54 3.38 1.58 3.14 3.15 2.77 1.94     
Gansu 3.68 3.81 3.44 3.88 3.84 4.14 4.11 3.98 3.47 2.94 3.23 3.34 2.47 3.12 4.12 3.87 3.59 3.65 2.14 2.79 2.00 3.71 3.53 3.27 2.19 3.55    
Qinghai 3.37 3.42 3.27 3.89 3.62 3.92 4.16 3.82 3.34 5.27 3.37 3.04 2.33 2.97 3.47 3.75 3.34 3.39 3.03 3.47 2.12 3.20 3.24 3.04 2.31 3.03 3.51   
Ningxia 4.22 4.36 4.40 3.45 4.53 5.27 3.25 5.22 3.67 2.96 3.47 3.64 2.65 3.30 4.06 4.22 3.46 3.73 3.03 2.89 2.43 3.95 3.61 3.56 2.49 3.63 4.10 3.93  
Xinjiang 4.15 3.77 4.51 5.76 4.02 5.88 7.17 5.87 2.57 4.33 2.85 3.22 1.93 2.81 4.09 3.60 3.47 3.12 2.17 3.21 1.80 3.84 3.46 2.11 1.97 3.45 3.52 3.09 4.35 
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Note: for Table A.4.1 and A.4.2 a) The first row of provincial names for price series (which are exactly transposed order of 
provincial names in the first column) are omitted due to limited space. b) Critical values for Johansen trace test statistics with 
the null of no cointegration (H0: r=0) in Table A.4.1 are 24.60 (1 %), 19.96 (5 %), 17.85 (10 %), and the null of cointegration 
(H0: r=1) in Table A.4.2 are 12.97 (1 %), 9.24 (5 %), 7.52 (10 %). 
 
Table A.5: Summary statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      435 0.908 0.064 0.687 0.999 
 ̂ ̂     435 0.027 0.012 0.008 0.089 
 ̂  435 -0.145 0.112 -0.576 0.108 
 ̂ ̂  435 0.057 0.019 0.019 0.121 
 ̂  435 0.160 0.118 -0.208 0.537 
 ̂ ̂  435 0.061 0.020 0.021 0.138 
 ̂   435 0.306 0.103 0.086 0.669 
   ̂  ̂   ̂   435 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.011 
 ̂ ̂   435 0.054 0.011 0.026 0.086 
    435 1.609 0.850 0.136 4.401 
    435 0.152 0.359 0.000 1.000 
   435 0.527 0.268 0.063 1.408 
    435 0.971 0.015 0.925 0.997 
 
Table A.6: Summary statistics for magnitude of market efficiency frontier 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Inefficiency 435 0.944 0.050 0.760 0.994 
Efficiency 435 0.059 0.055 0.006 0.275 
Frontier 435 0.967 0.012 0.925 0.987 
 
Table A.7: Summary statistics for speed of restoring market efficiency frontier 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Inefficiency 435 0.055 0.033 0.019 0.196 
Efficiency 435 0.947 0.030 0.822 0.981 
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Jilin 0.027 0.028 0.007 0.135 
Heilongjiang 0.026 0.030 0.006 0.119 
Liaoning 0.031 0.033 0.006 0.129 
Beijing 0.036 0.034 0.008 0.137 
Tianjin 0.037 0.037 0.007 0.141 
Shandong 0.037 0.037 0.008 0.137 
Inner Mongolia 0.038 0.037 0.007 0.152 
Shanxi 0.039 0.037 0.008 0.146 
Zhejiang 0.039 0.039 0.008 0.154 
Chongqing 0.041 0.039 0.006 0.146 
Hebei 0.042 0.039 0.008 0.169 
Henan 0.042 0.039 0.007 0.153 
Hunan 0.043 0.041 0.007 0.150 
Jiangsu 0.046 0.042 0.010 0.167 
Jiangxi 0.048 0.043 0.010 0.166 
Hubei 0.054 0.046 0.012 0.187 
Gansu 0.057 0.049 0.011 0.190 
Xinjiang 0.058 0.048 0.018 0.213 
Qinghai 0.058 0.051 0.010 0.222 
Guangxi 0.059 0.056 0.011 0.192 
Shaanxi 0.063 0.053 0.011 0.203 
Anhui 0.065 0.048 0.010 0.198 
Sichuan 0.066 0.052 0.011 0.195 
Hainan 0.073 0.058 0.020 0.234 
Fujian 0.082 0.056 0.018 0.227 
Guizhou 0.087 0.064 0.013 0.239 
Yunnan 0.090 0.065 0.013 0.248 
Guangdong 0.121 0.067 0.016 0.255 
Shanghai 0.133 0.063 0.016 0.275 
Ningxia 0.140 0.063 0.026 0.275 
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Figure A.1 Transport Cost and Distance 
 
 
Note：a) The cost is 450 in total if distance is within 50km. b) Tax is included. c) Total weight of pork for one vehicle is 20 


































IV Comparing Market Efficiency Frontiers 
Author: Yali Mu 
 
Abstract 
In the extensive empirical literature on testing the LOP, most studies find violations of the 
LOP and conclude that it does not hold. Rather than focusing on the simple 
acceptance/rejection of the LOP, it is more fruitful to compare actual adherence to this law 
with benchmarks. This concept is illustrated by analyzing the transmission of hog prices 
among 30 provinces in China and 23 member states in the EU. Two possible benchmarks are 
estimated, one for China and one for the EU by combining cointegration analysis with 
stochastic frontier analysis using monthly hog price data from July 2004 to December 2017. 
Stochastic frontier techniques make it possible               ‗     p       ‘                    
estimated price transmission elasticities. For most market pairs the estimated elasticity of 
price transmission is below the empirical frontier –                           ‗            ‘ or 
less than perfect adherence to the LOP on both Chinese hog markets and the EU hog markets. 
In addition, significant provincial effects (China) and member-state effects (EU) in market 
efficiency are found. Comparing the two benchmarks, the results show that the empirical 
frontier estimates of the elasticity of price transmission in the EU are lower than in China. 
This may reflect higher transport costs and more stringent animal welfare-based restrictions 
on transporting live hogs in the EU. 
Keywords: Spatial market integration, LOP, market efficiency, stochastic frontier, 
benchmark  
1 Introduction 
―    p                                              p        p            ‖ (B         
Schmiesing, 1988, p. 35). Spatial market integration involves linkages among markets 
separated by distance, which is often stated as the fundamental axiom –     ―L      O   
P    ‖ (LOP) (          -Taubadel and Goodwin, 2021). An extensive empirical literature 
has accumulated to investigate these price linkages (relationship) or              ―L  ‖     
markets that are separated by space, time and form over the last decades. Studies from the 
1960s are based on the analysis of correlation coefficients between prices (Harriss 1979). A 
shift from static price correlation models (Richardson, 1978) to dynamic models for price lag 
levels (Ravallion, 1986) generated new development in time series techniques employed on 
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commodity market integration analysis. Cointegration methods developed by Engle and 
Granger (1987), Johansen (1991, 1995) and Pesaran et al. (2001) have been used to account 
for the nature of price series (purely stationary, purely nonstationay or mixed with stationary 
and nonstationary) (Getnet et al., 2005; Svanidze and Götz, 2019a). Recent studies are 
capable of accounting for non-linearity (Emmanouilidis and Fousekis, 2012) and threshold 
effects (threshold cointegration – Gonzalo and Pitarakis, 2006; non-parametric threshold 
cointegration – Serra et al., 2006). All of these studies are motivated to account for the fact 
that the relationship between two prices in space will not necessarily be fully transmitted with 
100% completion over time due to phenomena such as changes in trade costs, government 
intervention policies, market transparency, and/or liquidity (Svanidze and Götz, 2019a), and 
changes in the direction of the trade (von Cramon-Taubadel and Goodwin, 2021).  
The EU adopted the Single Market Program to complete a large integrated market and to 
foster dynamic efficiency of all goods and services since the early 1990s. The analysis of 
price relationships across space allows researchers to assess whether markets are segmented 
or integrated under the Single Market. At the same time, Chinese policymakers have paid 
much attention to price fluctuations and have issued some policies to make pork prices stable 
(Dong et al., 2018). Few studies on hog market analysis in China include spatial market 
integration analysis (Pan and Li, 2019; Mu, 2018), asymmetric price transmission with the 
pork market (Dong et al., 2018). A few studies have empirically investigated the spatial 
integration of national EU hog markets. Most of them assess the hog markets by testing the 
validity of the LOP (weak version or strong version
1
 or both) in small subsets of national 
markets by employing unit root tests and cointegration analysis under the assumption of 
linearity (Sanjuán and Gil, 2001; Sosvilla and Gil, 2004; Fousekis, 2007) or threshold 
cointegration under the assumption of nonlinearity (Serra et.al, 2006; Emmanouilidis and 
Fousekis, 2012; Emmanouilidis and Proskynitopoulos, 2019). Most find some evidence often 
of the weak version of the LOP on pork markets. 
If we consider market efficiency to be synonymous with the economic concepts of 
equilibrium such as the LOP by following Barrett (2001), then in this situation opportunities 
for arbitrage have been exhausted (Fackler and Goodwin, 2001), therefore no unrealized 
potential Pareto improvements remain and markets are either in perfect integration or 
                                                             
1 As Fackler and Goodwin (2001) note, the weak form of the LOP is the spatial arbitrage condition   
    
     ; the 
strong form is with the relation in arbitrage condition taken with an equality sign (the presumption being that trade is 
continuous),   
    
     . 
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segmented equilibrium (Barrett and Li, 2002). Under segmentation, profitability opportunities 
are not exhausted, thus resulting in efficiency losses (Serra et al., 2006).  
Rather than focusing on the simple acceptance or rejection of the perfect integration of the 
LOP, we maintain that it is more fruitful to compare actual adherence to this law with 
benchmarks. The ultimate benchmark is the LOP in its strong version: For homogeneous 
commodities the same price at all locations at all times. However, this is analogous to the 
concept of frictionless motion in physics, behavior that will never be observed in reality. In 
the case of agricultural commodity markets, deviations from the strong form of the LOP will 
                   p      ‗        ‘: F         de costs (which drive a wedge between 
equilibrium prices at different locations). Second, trade delays (which, even if trade were 
costless, would still imply that it takes time for markets to return to equilibrium if one or more 
of them are shocked).  
It is possible to formulate weak forms of the LOP that                   ‗         ‘      
example, spatial equilibrium theory (Takayama and Judge, 1971; Barrett and Li, 2002), 
according to which the price differences for homogeneous commodities at different markets 
will be less than or equal to the trade costs between these markets. However, in empirical 
applications, even these weaker benchmarks will not be attained. The problem is that our 
estimates of trade costs will generally be incomplete because only some trade costs (e.g. fuel 
costs for transport) are observable, but many others are not (e.g. risk preferences, insurance 
premiums, market information research, government interventions). Furthermore, some 
factors are specific for certain agricultural commodities that could not be easily measured (e.g. 
anim                                      ‘ p      )   
In the following, we refer to the magnitude of market efficiency as the relative adherence 
extent to the strong version of the LOP, and in section 3 below we demonstrate that it can be 
measured using the long-run elasticity of price transmission between two markets. The basic 
idea is that we estimate the price transmission elasticity between two markets A and B which 
are spatially separated and compare these estimates with those for an otherwise identical pair 
of market C and market D. If we find that the estimated elasticity between C and D is lower 
than between A and B, then we can conclude that the magnitude of market efficiency between 
C and D is lower than between A and market B, market C and D adhere less to the strong 
form of the LOP than markets A and B.  
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Of course, in reality, we will rarely if ever find otherwise identical pairs of markets for 
comparison. The magnitudes of market efficiency are not comparable since differences in 
technology, infrastructure, and institutions of markets might lead to differences in the 
volumes of trade that can flow between them per unit of time. However, we can use 
econometric techniques to control for observable and unobservable differences between 
market pairs. Unless all other things being equal, once benchmarks of market efficiency are 
established within a country, market efficiency is comparable at the interregional level. 
Similarly, once a benchmark is established for countries, market efficiency could be 
compared between countries at the international level.  
Several studies do move forward to explain variations in the magnitude or speed of price 
transmission: Kouyaté and von Cramon-Taubadel (2016) identify geographic distance and 
international borders influence the magnitude and speed of market efficiency of cereal market 
by using meta-analysis. Kouyaté et al. (2016) show that distance, common borders, and 
common languages affect the likelihood of finding cointegration between rice markets in 
Western Africa; Holst and von Cramon-Taubadel (2013) identify that pig meat market 
integration of 15 EU members is stronger between new or old EU members, whereas market 
integration is relatively weaker between new and old members. They also find more rapid 
price transmission between members both are Euro-zone or sharing common borders; Mu 
(2018) estimates the determinants of speed of price transmission and finds that proximity 
matters for market integration of pork markets in China. Svanidze and Götz (2019a) compare 
the effects of factors (e.g. geographic distance, export volumes) on elasticities of price 
transmission for Russia and the US.  
In this paper we make two modifications to the literature outlined above, first focusing on the 
same agricultural commodity in two different economic systems during the same period. It 
can be expected that the EU hog markets differ a lot from Chinese hog markets even though 
both of them further increase their production due to structural changes of pig industry and 
optimal use of natural resources. Both China and the EU have the potential to produce more 
pigs. The pork production potential requires a spatially efficient hog market that ensures 
domestic integration between provinces in China and the international integration between 
member states of the EU. Nevertheless, a survey from supermarkets around the EU conducted 
by European Commission (2013) shows that imperfect market integration has been persistent 
over time, and prices for essentially identical commodities even in neighboring or comparable 
member states are not related so much. While studies for pork market in the EU and China 
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show us variations in the degree of spatial integration between members in the EU (Holst and 
von Cramon-Taubadel, 2013; Emmanouilidis and Proskynitopoulos, 2019) or between 
provinces in China (Pan and Li, 2019; Mu, 2018) are large.  
And second, estimating stochastic frontier to establish within-sample market efficiency 
frontiers against which performance can be measured, and comparing the established 
benchmarks by applying the procedure proposed in Chapter III. The stochastic frontier 
analysis enables us to identify the strongest examples of price transmission that can be 
attained in the given sets – China and the EU and attempts to explain why integration between 
markets is sometimes closer to or farther from this benchmark. In our application, the 
estimated frontier for China represents the strongest price transmission that is attainable 
between interprovincial pairs, and the estimated frontier for the EU represents the strongest 
p                                                           p                           p   ‘  
distance from that frontier is considered to be a measure of their market inefficiency at 
interprovincial level or international level. Thus we could compare the market efficiency 
distributions and frontiers of China and the EU.  
In this study, the empirical benchmarks of the hog market for both China and the EU could be 
assessed. Globally, the EU is the largest pork exporter (since 2013), whereas China is the 
largest pork producer and importer. Domestically, pork is mainly produced and consumed, 
and heavily traded within both China and the EU. Furthermore, the hog trade within China or 
the EU is covered by various geographic distances, which is essential for benchmarking 
market efficiency frontiers for spatially separated regions. The spatial integration of the 
international or interprovincial hog markets is also very heterogeneous. We aim to compare 
the spatial magnitude and frontier of hog market efficiency of the Chinese provinces against 
the EU member states.  
We use monthly data on hog prices at the international (23 member states in the EU) and 
interprovincial (30 provinces in China) levels from July 2004 to December 2017. The basic 
objective is to further explore the strengths and limitations of the proposed method in Chapter 
III. The international hog markets in the EU sharing an average distance of 1610 km (up to 
5100 km), whereas interprovincial markets are separated by a relatively large average distance 
of 1890 km (up to 4400 km). In the first step, we estimate the elasticities of price transmission 
between individual markets. In the second step, we benchmark the elasticities using stochastic 
frontier techniques and covariates such as the geographic distance and common border 
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between the markets in question, and finally, we compare the estimated magnitude and 
frontier of market efficiency for China to the EU.  
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: S       2    p          ‘          EU‘      
markets. In section 3 we outline the methodological framework and model specification. In 
section 4 we present the data that we use, and in section 5 we discuss empirical results. 
Conclusions and policy implications are drawn in the last section. 
2 Hog market characteristics of China and the EU 
In this section, the hog market of China is investigated in contrast with the EU by following a 
comparative approach. Table 1 presents some similarities and differences between the hog 
market in China and the EU. 
Table 1 Characteristics of hog market of China and the EU 
Characteristics China EU 
Primary livestock Pig Pig 
The primary use of pork Domestic consumption  Consumption and export 
Average carcass weight 77.64 kg 88.28 kg 
Transportation infrastructure Road, rail, and barge Road, rail, and barge 
Pig welfare Legislation developing Legislation developed 
Government intervention Various intervention  Less intervention
 
 
Futures market Since 2021 Volume futures market
 
 
Note: Average carcass weight equals to total slaughtered hog weight amount divided by slaughtered heads using data from 
the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture (2018) and European Commission (2021). 
The EU-23 produces approximately 23 million tons of pig meat from more than 249 million 
slaughtered pigs in 2017
2
. There were 144 million pigs in the 23 EU member states. Pigs are 
abundant in Denmark and the Netherlands while much scarcer in Greece and the UK and 
Slovenia and Slovakia. The hog industry is more intensive and more vertically integrated with 
some regions (Emmanouilidis and Fousekis, 2012; Gilbert, M. et al., 2015). The main 
production area extends from Denmark through northern Germany into the Belgium and 
Netherlands. To some extent, the location of farms for producing pigs in the EU is connected 
to easy access to ports where imported animal feed is unloaded (EPRS, 2020).  
                                                             
2 All data quoted in this section for China are from the Ministry of Agriculture of China, and data for the EU are derived from 
Eurostat and refer to EU-23 in our study sample. More statistics could be found in Table A.4 in Appendix A.5. 
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Similarly, hog production in China is concentrated in spatially protracted locations due to 
large and geographic variations (e.g. the natural environment, economic and social structure)
 3
. 
There were 442 million pigs in China in 2017, around 702.02 million pigs were slaughtered in 
China, the overall pork production was 54.52 million tonnes. Pigs are abundant in Yunnan 
and Hunan, while much scarcer in Shanghai and Ningxia in 2017. Currently, the main hog-
producing regions are located along the Yangtze River Northwards (Xiao et al., 2012). 
     ‘  ―     B   ‖                  p    p                                 50%          
Chinese pork production in 2017.
 4
   
Pig meat is produced with huge differences in methods and sizes of farms between member 
states: from small diversified farms keeping just one or two pigs to industrial installations 
with thousands of pigs, and from extensive organic farming to conventional intensive 
production. For example, Germany has the largest share of pig meat production (2017) in the 
EU with advantageous geographical location (easy access to sea ports, close to the members 
from which feed material is imported with small distances – Denmark and the Netherlands), 
high per   p    p          p        p    (      55    p           2017)             ‘ 
           p        (S ęp  ń     P       2016)  D      p                             
cooperative system of meat processing and distribution. Almost the entire pig production is 
processed by cooperatives that manage nearly 90% of the total produced pork. French pig 
farmers have strongly developed cooperation, they also hold stakes in the slaughterhouses to 
which they supply their pigs. Overall, the EU pig industry is more intensive and more 
vertically integrated (Gilbert, M. et al., 2015). 
The pork production system in China is still extensive with high densities of raised pigs 
(Gilbert, M. et al., 2015) from various sized farms (such as large commercial, medium-sized 
specialized) and small backyards (Tian and Cramon-Taubadel, 2020), moreover, the Chinese 
pig industry is not highly vertically integrated (Zhang et al., 2019). In 2010, around 450 
million heads of pigs were from farms with less than 100 finished pigs, which still accounted 
for about half of all slaughtered pigs in China.  
                                                             
3 For example, pork production and pork consumption in China is officially divided into six regions: the Yangtze River, 
North China, Northeast, Southeast, Municipalities and Other regions (Zhang et al., 2005). 
4 Stretching from northeast to southwest across China, the ―Corn Belt‖ includes 11 provinces and is divided into three regions 
(1) Northeast region: Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning and Inner Mongolia; (2) Yellow river-Huai river-Hai river region: Hebei, 
Henan, Shandong and Shanxi; and (3) Southwest mountainous region: Shaanxi, Sichuan and Yunnan (China Statistics 
Yearbook, 2012). 
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There exist relevant differences in average carcass weights, diet, and shopping place 
preferences across China and the EU member states. In 2017, the carcass weight produced 
across China is quite close with an average of 77.64 kg, while the average carcass weight 
from the EU members varies a lot. The average weight is 88.28 kg. The pig meat carcass 
weighs heaviest over 120 kg from Italy while the lightest under 60 kg from Greece. Although 
under the certain assumption, diets from the various regions of the world are                
            -       ―W           ‖ (L  M         F         2017  p 14)                    
between China and the EU is limited. But animal protein is mainly from pig meat products for 
both Chinese and EU consumers. Wet markets
5
 and small meat stores widely speed in both 
rural and urban areas in China that attract traditional consumers shopping for their 
convenience. For example, survey evidence in Beijing, Guangzhou, and Shanghai in 2014 
shows that over 40% of citizens only buy fresh pork in the local wet market (Xiao, 2016, 
Maruyama et al., 2016). While in the EU, grocery stores and supermarkets with cold storage 
facilities are the destinations for most consumers. 
The Chinese policy makers have implemented various policies designed to increase pig 
production and stabilize pork prices including subsidies and support for productive sows, 
breed improvement, disease control, the construction of large-scale pig farms, incentives for 
counties to increase the sale of live pigs, and centralized slaughtering policy. The state has 
implemented direct pork purchase, stockpiling, and market release policies designed to 
stabilize the market (Dong et al., 2019).
 6
 The EU policy makers have intervened less in pig 
markets relative to the markets of other livestock products (Serra et al., 2006; Emmanouilides 
    F         2012)  F       p                 ―p          ‖
 
triggered protests and block 
pork shipments from Germany and Spain by French pig farmers (USDA, 2015).
 7
 
China has made supernormal investments in road and rail infrastructure development in both 
rural and urban areas in the past decades (Newell et al., 2009), which significantly reduce the 
costs in transporting inputs and acquiring market information. China just launched live pig 
futures in Dalian (Liaoning province) at the very beginning of 2021 and becomes the second-
largest live pig future trade after the US. The EU farmers and hog buyers have participated 
                                                             
5 Each wet market consists of many individual stalls that offer fresh vegetable and fruit, live fish, and fresh meat and incur 
few or no menu costs in adjusting prices. 
6 I  M   2012      N        D     p         R                          ―                   p                         
                    p   p      ‖ 
7 Pig farmers in the EU have been complaining for years about low pork prices, leading many to refer to the persistent low 
EU p           ―p          ‖  
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earlier in hog futures markets since futures exchanges are operated earlier in some EU 
members (e.g. the Dutch Hog Futures Exchange, Amsterdam, or Hannover Stock Exchange). 
However, the number of knowledgeable pig farmers and operators at the futures exchanges is 
few (Meulenberg and Pennings, 2002). Crucial factors such as complex trade logistics, 
stringent quality-control standards, immature futures contracts for operating futures contracts, 
and a retail trading community that has wildly distorted markets in other countries will be 
challenges for China as well (Reuters, 2020). Further developing hog futures markets benefit 
both China and the EU. 
In summary, the Chinese hog market is characterized by a large number of small holders from 
producers, wet markets to hot meat-preferring consumers with stabilizing prices under 
          ‘               , while the EU hog market is with more large modern hog 
producers, supermarkets, and chilled pork-preferring consumers with less intervention from 
the EU policymakers. Market characteristics other than geographic distance (and its 
associated transport costs) can also affect price relationships. The causes of incomplete hog 
price transmission may also encompass the intervention policy from authorities, especially if 
it is non-transparent (Liefert, 2009) and non-consistent (e.g. different extent of compliance 
     p                      )                             (―p          ‖        EU)  I p       
market transparency and information flows of hog markets might also prevent full-price 
transmission. In any case, price transmission patterns are likely to have been altered by both 
supply and demand for pig meat changing and policy interventions triggering (Serra et al., 
2006). 
3 Methods and specification 
The procedure to benchmark the magnitude of market efficiency is following the proposed 
method in Chapter III. First, a pairwise approach to estimate price transmission elasticity is 
similar to that employed in the earlier studies outlined above (e.g. Getnet et al., 2005; 
Svanidze and Götz, 2019a). In the second step, we estimate stochastic market efficiency 
frontiers of the estimated magnitude of market efficiency. 
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3.1 Measurement and determinants of market efficiency 
The first step of our procedure is similar to that employed in Chapter III, we estimate equation 




                              +            +                                               (1) 
    {        } index provinces in China;     {        } index member states in the 
EU. Estimation is carried out for the 435 pairs of provinces in China and 253 pairs of member 
states in the EU for which    . The index   {         }  counts monthly price 
observations from July 2004 to December 2017.  
435 and 253 estimates of the elasticity of price transmission ( ̂    ) are generated from the 
first-step estimation for China and the EU, respectively. We consider the estimated  ̂     to be 
measures of the relative magnitude of market efficiency defined above.  
In the second step of our procedure, we estimate stochastic frontier models for  ̂    :  
 ̂        +                (2) 
where    is a vector of variables that are expected to influence  ̂    , such as the distance     
and common border     between the markets, and   is a vector of parameters to be estimated.  
We consider  ̂     as the magnitude of market efficiency following Chapter III. The strong 
form of the LOP noted by Fackler and Goodwin (2001) can be written as: 
                                                                         +                                  (3) 
where     represents the trade costs from market   to market  . The elasticity of price 
transmission between two markets that satisfy this condition,    
  , is defined as 
   
   
   





      
  
   
   
  
      (4) 
which could be interpreted as the cost-share of the commodity in the lower-price market j in 
the price of the commodity in the higher-price market i.
9
 The higher the trade costs    , the 
                                                             
8 All prices are in natural logarithms, We normalise the long-run equilibrium relationship in equation (1) on the higher of the 
two prices, so that       is expected to be less than or equal to 1. 
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lower the elasticity of price transmission between them. We assume that commodity trade 
costs are a function of the distance between two markets:      (   ), where     is the 
distance between markets   and  , and with 
       
    
     
First, consider markets within a country (within China or the EU), combining equations (3) 
and (4), we expect that the magnitude of market efficiency between two markets is a 
decreasing function of the distance between them. Hence, we expect that  ̂    , which is an 
estimate of the elasticity    
  , will decrease with the increasing distance between markets   
and  . The stochastic frontier for  ̂     as a function of    , which we label      
∗ , defines for 
any given     the maximum elasticity of price transmission, and thus the minimum value of 
    that can be attained in the setting under consideration (such as hog markets in China or the 
EU).  
Second, consider markets between countries (between China and the EU), transport costs are 
                             (              )         p               p     (―          ‖)       
In this case, the cost share of transport in the EU is higher, correspondingly, the elasticity of 
price transmission is lower in general, so we would expect the magnitude of market efficiency 
in the EU is lower than in China. And the estimated frontier      
∗  of the EU might lie below 
the frontier of China. 
3.2 Model specification 
In the empirical application, markets         are provinces in China and member states in the 
EU. Before estimating, we first do the ADF test (Said and Dickey, 1984) to check the nature 
of price series (stationary or nonstationary). Then Johansen cointegration test (Johansen, 1988) 
and the bounds testing approach (Pesaran et al., 2001) are used to check the existence of the 
long-run equilibrium for all the unique hog price pairs for both China and the EU. 
The selection of the appropriate econometric model to estimate the elasticity of price 
transmission depends on the previously tested characteristics of the price series (in Appendix 
A.3), resulting in three cases as talked about in detail in Appendix A.4.  
As mentioned above, distance     between markets,   and   is included in the vectors    in the 
frontier models (4). It is expected that the frontier magnitude will fall in both China and the 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
9 The same as footnote 24 in Chapter III (      G      ‘          ). 
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EU as     increases. The stochastic frontier for  ̂      as a function of    , which we label      
∗  , 
defines for any given     the maximum elasticity of price transmission, and thus the minimum 
value of transport cost that can be attained in the setting under consideration (such as hog 
markets in China and the EU). We, therefore, interpret deviations from the frontier      
∗  as 
deviations from the maximum attainable market efficiency. For example,  ̂     for a specific 
pair of markets   and   separated by distance     might lie below the frontier      
∗  at     
because transport cost between the two markets is higher than it could be based on the 
evidence provided by the full set of  ̂     for all available market pairs. 
In addition, a dummy variable     in included which equals 1 if markets   and   share a 
common border (interprovincial for China and international for the EU). If borders between 
provinces in China or the EU impede trade flow or information flow in any manner, then all 
other things being equal, a higher market efficiency frontier is expected to be attained 
between markets that share a common border.  
    in equation (2) are two-sided error terms,             
   capture random factors such as 
measurement error. Since the dependent variables  ̂     are estimated,     are heteroscedastic.
 
Therefore we model heteroscedasticity as     
           .     are vectors that include a 
constant term and the estimated standard errors ( ̂ ̂    ) of the estimated   ̂    .   is a parameter 
vector to be estimated. While the estimated standard errors  ̂ ̂     of the  ̂     are directly 
attainable by-products from the estimation of equation (1).  
The one-sided error terms     are assumed to be half normal distributed (     
      
  ) and 
uncorrelated with   . The market pair  ,   attains the market efficiency frontier with no 
inefficiency if      , and correspondingly there is inefficiency if     .    
           , 
vectors     are province dummies in the one-sided inefficiency terms     to capture province-
specific effects (such as differences in the quality of infrastructure, cultural and religious 
differences) for China, and member state dummies to capture state-specific effects for the EU 
that explain inefficiency.   are parameters to be estimated. 




4.1 Price series data 
To look into the integration of Chinese and EU primary hog markets more thoroughly, the 
market efficiency analysis is conducted for the hog producing regions of China at the 
interprovincial level and the EU at the international level from July 2004 to December 2017. 
Monthly prices of the hog (Yuan/kg) for 30 provinces in China are used at the interprovincial 
level. Tibet is excluded because of missing data. Correspondingly, monthly hog prices 
(Euro/kg) for 23 EU member states are employed at the international level. Two isolated 
members owing very small size (Malta and Cyprus) and two recently joined (after the 
beginning of our study period) members (Bulgaria in 2007 and Croatia in 2013) are excluded. 
The United Kingdom is included since the study period is before Brexit (official date: January 
31, 2020).  Table 2 describes the price series and sources for the data used in this study, 
names and capitals of the analyzed markets is presented in detail in Appendix A.1, while 
several typical hog price series selected from a set of 30 in China and a set of 23 in the EU are 
plotted in Figure A.1 and Figure A.2 Appendix A.2. Thus, we analyze 435 provincial hog 
price pairs for China and 253 member-state hog price pairs for the EU, respectively. 
Table 2: Database underlying the market efficiency analysis 
Hog markets Price pairs Price frequency Source 
Interprovincial    
China (30 provinces) 435 Monthly (162 obs.) Min. of Ag. (2018) 
International    
EU (23 members) 253 Monthly (162 obs.)  European Commission (2021) 
 
4.2 Measure of market efficiency frontier 
In the second step, stochastic frontier models are estimated for the magnitude of market 
efficiency ( ̂    ) for each market pair between July 2004 and December 2017. Distribution of 
the estimated  ̂     for China and the EU, hog markets are provided in Figure 2 in the 
following section 5. The statistical description of estimated  ̂     for each interprovincial price 
pair in China and international price pair in the EU are reported in Table 5 in section 6.1. 
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Distance (    in 1000 km between provincial capitals in China or between member-state 
capitals in the EU), common borders are measured as determinants of the frontier of market 
efficiency. 29 province dummies for China and 22 states dummies for EU are introduced 
separately to consider the differences (culture, religion) between provinces in China and 
between member states in the EU. A detailed description of all variables and their source is 
described in Appendix A.5, whereas key descriptive statistics of these variables for 
interprovincial and international analysis are summarized in Table 5 in section 6.1. 
5 Results 
At the interprovincial level, for each of the 30 hog price series of Chinese provinces 
individually the ADF test (Said and Dickey, 1984) fails to reject the null hypothesis that the 
series is I(1), but rejects this null hypothesis for the first differences of the hog prices. While 
at the international level, the hog price series of the 23 EU member states are mixes of I(1) 
and I(0) ( pp      B)  S                                J       ‘  (1991; 1995)               
the price pairs are involved in the whole set for our analysis first. In response for pairs with 
I(1) and I(0) or both I(0) pairs in the international analysis, then we use the bounds testing 
approach by using Pesaran and Shin (1998) and Pesaran et al. (2001). Cointegration test 
results are presented in detail in Appendix A.4. 
First step: Figure 2 presents the distribution of the 435 estimated elasticities of the long-run 
price transmission (  ̂    ) for China and the 253 estimated elasticities for the EU. The 
estimates range between zero and one and the magnitude of  ̂     is higher than 0.6 for all the 
Chinese cases. However, over one-third of the 253 estimated  ̂     is lower than 0.6 for all the 
EU cases, indicating a higher incidence of a lower magnitude of market efficiency in the EU 
compared to China. More than a half of the 435 estimated  ̂     for China are greater than 0.9; 
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Figure 2: Distribution of  ̂     for China and the EU 
 
Source: Own calculations using Chinese Ministry of Agriculture (2018) and European Commission (2021).  
Second step: Tables 3 and 4 present the estimation results of the frontier model for the 
magnitude of market efficiency (equation (4), the dependent variable  ̂    ) for China and the 
EU respectively. According to these results, the frontier of  ̂     falls by 1% per 1000 km of 
distance between two provinces in China and 3.3% per 1000 km of the distance between two 
member states in the EU. The difference in the influence of distance on  ̂     in China and the 
EU at the two levels of market efficiency analysis provides further evidence of the 
dissimilarity in the underlying fundamental mechanism of market efficiency. Sharing a 
common border has expected a positive but insignificant effect on the magnitude of market 
efficiency. The estimated frontier for China is above the estimated frontier for the EU, while 
the influence of distance increases three times in the EU at the international level compared to 
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Table 3: Estimated magnitude of market efficiency frontier of China (Heilongjiang 












(    ) 
Constant 0.994 0.005 188.36 0.984 1.004 
    -0.010 0.003 -3.3 -0.016 -0.004 
    0.004 0.005 0.81 -0.006 0.014 
Random error 
    
            
Constant -8.644 0.469 -18.43 -9.563 -7.725 
 ̂ ̂     14.879 9.263 1.61 -3.276 33.035 
Inefficiency term   
    
             
Constant -8.207 0.645 -12.73 -9.471   -6.944 
Tianjin 0.186 0.428 0.43 -0.653 1.025 
Shandong 0.238 0.428 0.56 -0.602 1.078 
Hebei 0.280 0.422 0.66 -0.546 1.107 
Jiangsu 0.329 0.422 0.78 -0.497 1.156 
Henan 0.359 0.428 0.84 -0.480 1.198 
Guangxi 0.378 0.413 0.92 -0.430 1.187 
Shanxi 0.419 0.423 0.99 -0.409 1.247 
Hubei 0.478 0.423 1.13 -0.352 1.308 
Liaoning 0.501 0.412 1.21 -0.307 1.308 
Ningxia 0.537 0.421 1.28 -0.288 1.362 
Inner 0.543 0.421 1.29 -0.281 1.368 
Hunan 0.573 0.425 1.35 -0.260 1.406 
Jilin 0.577 0.413 1.4 -0.233 1.387 
Shaanxi 0.771 0.418 1.84 -0.048 1.591 
Qinghai 1.171 0.444 2.64 0.302 2.041 
Anhui 1.294 0.438 2.96 0.436 2.152 
Xinjiang 1.663 0.480 3.46 0.722 2.605 
Guizhou 2.068 0.419 4.94 1.248 2.889 
Jiangxi 2.199 0.441 4.99 1.335 3.063 
Zhejiang 2.289 0.442 5.18 1.422 3.156 
Gansu 2.434 0.424 5.74 1.603 3.266 
Beijing 2.483 0.452 5.49 1.597 3.369 
Yunnan 2.904 0.425 6.83 2.071 3.737 
Hainan 3.008 0.434 6.92 2.156 3.859 
Fujian 3.056 0.446 6.85 2.181 3.931 
Shanghai 3.058 0.452 6.76 2.171 3.944 
Chongqing 3.182 0.436 7.3 2.327 4.036 
Sichuan 3.336 0.437 7.64 2.480 4.193 
Guangdong 3.613 0.450 8.03 2.731 4.494 
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(    ) 
Constant 0.921 0.023 39.43 0.875 0.967 
    -0.033 0.011 -2.95 -0.055 -0.011 
    0.019 0.020 0.94 -0.021 0.058 
Random error 
    
            
Constant -5.593 0.245 -22.8 -6.074 -5.112 
 ̂ ̂     7.762 1.478 5.25 4.866 10.659 
Inefficiency term   
    
             
Constant -7.678 1.222 -6.28 -10.073 -5.282 
Slovakia 0.113 1.175 0.1 -2.191 2.416 
Czechia 0.195 0.992 0.2 -1.750 2.139 
Spain 0.299 1.042 0.29 -1.744 2.342 
Austria 0.400 0.755 0.53 -1.079 1.880 
Italy 0.484 0.994 0.49 -1.465 2.432 
Estonia 0.558 0.914 0.61 -1.233 2.350 
Netherlands 0.771 0.726 1.06 -0.652 2.194 
Latvia 0.776 0.749 1.04 -0.691 2.243 
Lithuania 0.874 0.748 1.17 -0.592 2.340 
Germany 0.875 0.772 1.13 -0.638 2.387 
Ireland 0.880 0.827 1.06 -0.740 2.500 
France 0.947 0.801 1.18 -0.623 2.516 
Denmark 1.183 0.850 1.39 -0.482 2.849 
Luxembourg 1.251 0.753 1.66 -0.225 2.727 
Finland 1.268 1.070 1.19 -0.829 3.365 
Belgium 1.527 0.738 2.07 0.080 2.973 
Slovenia 1.819 0.772 2.36 0.306 3.333 
Portugal 2.316 0.795 2.91 0.758 3.873 
Poland 2.988 0.758 3.94 1.503 4.474 
Greece 3.379 0.796 4.25 1.819 4.939 
UK 3.863 0.784 4.93 2.327 5.398 
Sweden 5.298 0.864 6.13 3.603 6.992 
Source: Own estimations. 
Figure 3 presents a scatterplot of the 688 estimates of  ̂     (435 estimates for China and 253 
estimates for the EU) against distance     as well as the estimated market efficiency frontiers 
based on the results in Table 3 for China and Table 4 for the EU. We see the estimated 
frontiers for both China and the EU differ considerably from the OLS estimates. 
In Figure 3 we highlight all of the market pairs that include Heilongjiang (the most efficient 
province) as well as all of the market pairs that include Guangdong (the least efficient 
province). In comparison, we highlight all of the market pairs that include Hungary (the most 
efficient member) as well as all of the market pairs that include Sweden (the least efficient 
member) in the EU. It is readily apparent that the individual  ̂     are on average farther from 
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the frontier for market pairs that include Guangdong than for market pairs that include 
Heilongjiang in China; similarly, the individual  ̂     are on average farther from the frontier 
for market pairs that include Sweden than for market pairs that include Hungary in the EU.  
As expected, the estimated standard errors of the estimates of  ̂     from the first step of the 
analysis ( ̂ ̂    ) have a significant positive influence on the variance of the random error     
(    
 ). Furthermore, there are significant provincial effects and member-state effects in the 
variance     
  of the one-sided inefficiency term    . We have omitted the dummy for the 
province Heilongjiang in the estimation for China and Hungary in the estimation for the EU; 
all other province dummies and member state dummies have positive effects on the variance 
of the inefficiency term (increasing from the top to the bottom of the list in Table 3 and Table 
4). This indicates that the variance of the inefficiency term is higher for market pairs that 
include these other provinces or these other member states. In some cases (e.g. Tianjin and 
Shandong at the top of the list of Table 3; Slovakia and Czechia at the top of the list of Table 
4) the estimated additional variance relative to Heilongjiang or Hungary is small and 
insignificant; moving down the list it becomes larger, and from Shaanxi province onward it is 
statistically significant at the 5% level for China; and from Belgium onward it is statistically 
significant at the 5% level for the EU. The provinces near the top (bottom) of the list in Table 
3 and the member states near the top (bottom) of the list in Table 4 are also the provinces and 
members that attain the highest (lowest) average magnitudes of market efficiency.  
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Figure 3: Estimated  ̂     and market efficiency frontier in China and the EU 
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6 Discussion and policy implications 
Market efficiency for both China and the EU are benchmarked and compared by following the 
proposed two-step procedure in Chapter III: first price transmission elasticities, in the long run, 
are obtained as the magnitude of market efficiency by utilizing method based on the stationary or 
nonstationary nature of price series; then coupled with frontier estimation methods that 
accounting for sampling errors in the estimates of the magnitude of market efficiency, we 
estimate factors distance and common border that could determine the market efficiency frontier 
as well as regional effects in inefficiency terms. The use of frontier methods allows us to estimate 
within-sample benchmarks for the magnitude of market efficiency at the interprovincial level in 
China and the international level in the EU.  
6.1 Discussion of results 
The results reported above for the market efficiency frontier for China differ from the one for the 
EU in several respects. Figure 4 presents the distributions of the estimated inefficiencies for the 
magnitude of market efficiency (i.e. how far are the observed  ̂     from the corresponding 
frontier estimates      
∗ ) for both China and the EU.  
The distribution of the inefficiency scores for the magnitude of market efficiency for China in 
Figure 4 shows that for many market pairs the long-run elasticity of price transmission is within 
0.05 (5%) of the frontier. In comparison, the distribution of the inefficiency scores for the 
magnitude of market efficiency for the EU shows that for many market pairs the long-run 
elasticity of price transmission is within 0.1 (10%) of the frontier. The average inefficiency is 8% 
in China and 11% in the EU, as presented in Table 5. Significant provincial effects and member-
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Figure 4: Distributions of inefficiency for the magnitude of market efficiency for China and 
the EU  
  
Source: Own calculations using Chinese Ministry of Agriculture (2018) and European Commission (2021). 
Table 5: Summary statistics  
variable 







 ̂     435 0.88 0.08 0.61 0.99 
     
∗  435 0.98 0.01 0.95 0.99 
    435 0.08 0.06 0.01 0.29 
Interregional analysis-EU 
 ̂     253 0.75 0.18 0.18 0.99 
     
∗  253 0.87 0.03 0.78 0.94 
    253 0.11 0.13 0.02 0.68 
Source: Own estimations. 
To illustrate these effects, in Figures 5 (a) and (b) each province and member state is shaded 
according to the average market efficiency of the pairs in which it is included.  
Figure 5(a): Provincial differences in the magnitude of hog market efficiency in China 




Source: Own expression. 
Consider first the magnitude of market efficiency for China. We see that market pairs involving 
provinces located in Central China are characterized by the highest magnitude of market 
efficiency and that the magnitude of market efficiency tends to be lower for provinces located 
farther to the South and West. Provinces with the lowest level of market efficiency are 
Guangdong, Shanghai, and Fujian. Perhaps imports (to Shanghai) and exports (from Guangdong 
and Fujian to Hong Kong) are affecting prices in these provinces. Pork product consumption 
preferences could also be one reason. The coastal regions such as Shanghai, Guangdong are 
richer, pork consumed in these regions is, therefore, prone to be different from central regions 
(Zhang et al., 2019). Sichuan and Chongqing in Southwest of China also stand out, this finding is 
in line with Pan and Li (2019) relative remoteness might contribute to these results. 
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Figure 5(b): National differences in the magnitude of hog market efficiency in the EU  
 
Source: Own expression. 
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In comparison, we see that market pairs involving members located in the central EU are 
characterized by the highest magnitude of market efficiency, this finding is in line with 
Emmanouilides and Proskynitopoulos (2019), indicating that markets with high values of 
interaction strengths and appear to be spatially located in central Europe and to be contiguous. 
And that the magnitude of market efficiency tends to be lower for members located farther to the 
North. Members with lower levels of market efficiency include Sweden, UK, and Greece. UK 
and Greece are relatively remote. As also indicated by Emmanouilides and Proskynitopoulos 
(2019), markets spatially located to the periphery of Europe have smaller closeness centralities 
(Sweden, UK, and Greece are among their list). As a net importer, Swedish hog prices are 
relatively higher than other EU members. The retail sector focuses very much on national 
sourcing so that Swedish meat can get a price premium. This finding is in line with Serra, et al. 
(2006) as they indicate that in the importing country, pig prices include larger transaction costs 
than in the exporting country. Pig welfare rules above the EU standards and average carcass 
weight below the average carcass weight in the EU might also be reasons for higher hog prices in 
Sweden since a higher weight of hog is reducing the slaughter costs per kg of the carcass (USDA, 
2020).  
It is evident from our results that distance is significantly influencing the magnitude of spatial 
market efficiency. The influence of distance is considerably higher at the international level (the 
EU) than at the interprovincial level (China).  
First, consider the role of transportation cost. If we treat the estimated market efficiency frontiers 
as the benchmark of the LOP (at least slightly below the strong form) for hog markets in China 
and the EU, ceteris paribus, the elasticity of price transmission will tend towards the cost share of 
the product in the export location in the price of the product in the import location (   in 
G      ‘  (1975)         )  I               is smaller in the EU than in China, correspondingly 
the transportation cost share (1-  ) is higher in the EU than in China. Trade barriers might be 
smaller across interprovincial borders than international borders, which makes international trade 
more costly.  
Policy interventions for hog markets and animal welfare regulations during hog transport might 
play some roles as well. The Chinese policymakers have implemented various policies designed 
to make pork prices stable (Dong et al., 2019). Market monitoring activities by the Chinese 
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central government are generally high and consistent. While the EU officials have intervened less 
in pig markets (Serra et al., 2006). That is why the magnitude of market efficiency is more 
heterogeneous for the EU. Distance accounts for variable trade costs related to trade, playing a 
major role in the spatial market integration especially when animal welfare-based restrictions are 
associated (administrate costs, upgrading vehicle costs, etc.).  
The transport costs, especially over longer distances, are quite a bit higher for hogs in the EU 
than in China. Transport costs are perhaps even a bit non-linear (Barrett and Li, 2002; Serra et al., 
2006) for hogs - beyond a certain threshold they become very high (rest time is scheduled for 
pigs during long journeys, (European Commission, 2005)). Arbitraging between member states 
sharing extremely long-distance (e.g. Finland and Portugal, 4385 km) is essentially impossible, it 
has to take place in steps. Similarly, this is also true for very long distances (e.g. Xinjiang and 
Hainan, 4401 km) in China even if animal welfare regulations in China are not as strict as the EU.  
6.2 Policy implications 
Since distance shapes the hog market efficiency frontier in both China and the EU significantly, 
both China and the EU have experienced rapid economic growth and restructuring over the study 
period, and will further process transformation deeply for sure beyond. Nevertheless, 
underdeveloped infrastructure (e.g. road, rail), may restrict the distance (inefficiency) to the 
potential maximum market efficiency, infrastructure available for transportation and trade during 
          p                                                   EU‘    g market efficiency up. From 
our study, we find significant provincial effects and member-state effects in market integration. 
Substantial development in the hog market and transportation infrastructure should be invested 
by both Chinese and EU officials e p               ―          ‖         (                    
markets). 
Unlike grain trade, animal or animal product trade is under stricter restrictions, increasing 
                                     p                         ―                 ‖          
decreased. Further developing the hog futures market and information services in China and the 
EU could foster more spread of information thus improve the efficiency of the hog market in both 
China and the EU. 
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Alternatively, Chinese and the EU officials as well could support the restructuring of feed (e.g. 
corn) supply chain intensified in the hog production regions, if animals or animal products are in 
transit under stricter regulations (animal welfare) and conditions (cold chain storage on truck) 
than grain especially the cost of transport starts to get large over too long distances (animals 
injured, stressed, etc.), which could reduce the interprovincial hog transportation size in China 
                           p                EU  F       p         ‘   wine production in the 
Northeast probably be affected by increased corn production as larger companies seek to expand, 
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Appendix of Chapter IV 
Appendix A.1: Markets analyzed in question  
Markets analyzed in question are listed as follows: 
- 30 Provinces for hog markets of China at the inter-provincial level (Appendix of Chapter 
III).  
- 23 Member states for hog markets of the EU at the interregional level.   
 
Table A.1: List of selected markets in the EU 
  International analysis  
                               EU 
Member state Capital 
Belgium  Brussels 
Czechia Prague 
Denmark Copenhagen 
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Appendix A.2: Hog piece series selected from a set of China and the EU 
Figure A.1(a): Four hog price series of China (monthly data from Jul. 2004 to Dec. 2017) 
 
Source: Chinese Ministry of Agriculture (2018).  
Figure A.1(b): Four hog price series of the EU (monthly data from Jul. 2004 to Dec. 2017) 
 
Source: European Commission (2021). 
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Appendix A.3: ADF test 
For each of the hog price series of 30 Chinese provinces individually the ADF test (Said and 
Dickey, 1984) fails to reject the null hypothesis that the series is I(1), but rejects this hypothesis 
for first differences. However, ADF test results show that 5 hog price series (Czechia, Estonia, 
Greece, Slovakia, and Finland) are I(0), the other 18 hog price series I(1) for the 23 EU member 
states. 
Table A.2: ADF test for prices in levels and first differences 
Price series Lag T-statistic Δ Price series Lag T-statistic 
 China (intraregional analysis)   
Beijing  3 -2.437 Δ B  j    2 -8.076
***
 
Tianjin 2 -2.677 Δ T  j   1 -8.727
***
 
Hebei  4 -2.401 Δ H     3 -6.787
***
 
Shanxi 3 -2.349 Δ S      2 -7.904
***
 
Inner Mongolia 2 -2.650 Δ I     M        1 -6.897
***
 
Liaoning 3 -2.534 Δ L        2 -7.803
***
 
Jilin 3 -2.595 Δ J     2 -7.817
***
 
Heilongjinag 3 -2.983 Δ H ilongjiang 2 -6.968
***
 
Shanghai 2 -3.029 Δ S        2 -7.999
***
 
Jiangsu 3 -2.915 Δ J       2 -6.959
***
 
Zhejiang 3 -2.874 Δ Z  j     2 -7.377
***
 
Anhui 3 -2.743 Δ       2 -7.291
***
 
Fujian 2 -2.972 Δ F j    2 -8.113
***
 
Jiangxi 3 -2.667 Δ J       2 -7.267
***
 
Shandong 3 -2.423 Δ S        2 -8.193
***
 
Henan 3 -2.581 Δ H     2 -7.650
***
 
Hubei 3 -2.621 Δ H     2 -7.323
***
 
Hunan 3 -2.606 Δ H     2 -7.257
***
 
Guangdong 3 -2.704 Δ G         2 -7.010
***
 
Guangxi 2 -2.709 Δ G       1 -7.554
***
 
Hainan 2 -2.772 Δ H      1 -8.014
***
 
Chongqing 2 -2.916 Δ           1 -7.729
***
 
Sichuan 2 -2.863 Δ S       1 -7.360
***
 
Guizhou 3 -2.159 Δ G  z    2 -7.224
***
 
Yunnan 2 -2.466 Δ Y      2 -6.133
***
 
Shaanxi 3 -2.697 Δ S       2 -7.216
***
 
Gansu 2 -2.787 Δ G     2 -7.651
***
 
Qinghai 1 -2.382 Δ Q       1 -8.216
***
 
Ningxia 2 -3.118 Δ N       1 -7.685
***
 




EU (interregional analysis)  
Belgium  2 -4.137
***
 Δ B       1 -7.453
***
 





 Δ D       1 -7.051
***
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Germany  2 -4.434
***
 Δ G       1 -7.815
***
 





 Δ I       1 -6.674
***
 
Greece 1 -3.951 
**
 Δ G      1 -7.872
***
 























































 Δ S        1 -7.760
***
 
Slovakia 5 -2.905 Δ S        1 -7.832
***
 










 Δ UK 2 -7.131
***
 
Note: ADF test (Said and Dickey, 1984), lag length selection is based on Schwarz Information Criterion. The deterministic 
component is a constant and linear trend. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
Appendix A.4: Test of linear cointegration 
J       ‘  (1991; 1995)                                                                             
rejected for 364 hog price pairs at the 1% level of significance, and 44 price pairs at the 5% level, 
and for another 10 pairs at the 10% level; in 17 of the 435 price pairs are the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration not rejected at conventional levels of significance for China. 
For 152 of the 253 price pairs of the 23 EU member states, there is no cointegration at 
conventional levels of significance; Only in 101 price pairs that the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration is rejected at conventional levels of significance (81 pairs at the 1% level of 
significance; 13 price pairs at the 5% and the left 7 pairs at the 10%).  
Overall, for the Chinese setting, we estimated the 435 bivariate VECMs in equation (A1) using 
J       ‘  (1991  1995)                         to retrieve      .  
[
       







] [                            ] + ∑ [
      
      
]    [
         
         
] + [
    
    
] (A1) 
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The lag-length   in equation (A1) is chosen using the Schwarz Bayesian Information Criteria 
(SBIC: Lütkepohl 2005, pp. 156-157). 
For the EU setting, we hereafter conduct a bound test for all the pairs with I(0) and I(1) series by 
comparing the F-statistic for the joint significance of the lagged levels in Equation (A2) with the 
asymptotic critical values tabulated by Pesaran et al. (2001).  
             +      (                            ) + ∑               
 
   + ∑               
 
   +    (A2) 
The asymptotic critical value bounds with a constant and without a time trend are 4.04 as lower 
and 4.78 as upper bound at the 10% significance level. The calculated F-statistics exceed the 
upper bound for these specifications, no long-run level relationship for these pairs is rejected. 
This confirms the presence of a non-spurious long-run relationship for these pairs. We retrieve 
     for pairs of hog prices by estimating the ARDL model (Pesaran et al., 2001) in equation (A2). 
  is the lag order of independent series   ,   is the autoregressive order.
 1
 
So for all the 253 market pairs of the EU, we estimate for 153 OLSs following equation (1); 4 
bivariate VECMs following equation (A1); and the left 96 ARDLs following equation (A2) by 
using Pesaran et al. (2001).  
Appendix A.5: Description of variables and sources 
China/EU: Price transmission elasticities estimates (  ̂    ) between markets   and   for each 
market pair    .  
 
Hog price  
 
The hog price data for both China and the EU are producer prices, what farmers get when they 
sell their pigs. And the data are carried out weekly and weighted average for monthly, which 
makes our analysis comparable. The Chinese provincial monthly averages are based on weekly 
observations monitored by the Ministry of Agriculture of China at hundreds of markets in all 
provinces of China. The EU monthly hog prices are the weighted average of the weekly data 
reported from the Member States to the European Commission. 
 
                                                             
1 We choose (0, 1) as lag order for ( ,  ) after comparing the results estimated by using BIC lag orders and OLS estimation, we 
risk under estimating   ̂     if we increase the lag orders for ARDL estimations. 
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China: Hog prices (Yuan/kg) are from the Ministry of Agriculture of China and were collected 
from 30 provinces. Source: http://www.moa.gov.cn/ 
EU: Hog prices (Euro/kg) for EU (23 members in our analysis) are from the European 




China: road distance (1 000 kilometers) between markets   and  ; calculated as road distance 
between capitals of provinces. Source: Baidu Map (https://map.baidu.com/). 
EU: road distance (1 000 kilometers) between markets   and  ; calculated as road distance 
between capitals of member states. Sources: Google Map (www.google.com/maps). 
 
Common border (   ) 
China (interprovincial border): a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 provinces   and   is 
observed in a market pair that share a common border and is equal to 0 otherwise. 66 provincial 
pairs are sharing common borders.  
 
EU (international border): a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 member state   and   is 
observed in a market pair share a common border and is equal to 0 otherwise. There are 32 states‘ 
pairs sharing common borders.   
 
Table A.3: Summary statistics of variables 
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
China 
Distance (1000 km) 1.89 1.05 0.07 5.11 
Common border 0.12 0.32 0 1 
EU 
Distance (1000 km) 1.61 0.85 0.14 4.40 
Common border 0.13 0.34 0 1 
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Beijing  0.19 1.12 5.17 0.19 0.44 79.31 
Tianjin 0.23 1.80 11.56 0.23 0.32 76.04 
Hebei  2.92 19.58 26.03 2.92 1.51 77.01 
Shanxi 0.63 5.44 14.70 0.63 0.75 76.20 
Inner 
Mongolia 0.74 5.06 19.99 0.74 0.51 79.98 
Liaoning 2.21 13.08 29.94 2.21 0.88 84.08 
Jilin 1.36 9.11 33.53 1.36 0.55 80.45 
Heilongjinag 1.59 14.34 37.84 1.59 0.76 76.20 
Shanghai 0.15 1.11 4.60 0.15 0.49 76.96 
Jiangsu 2.14 16.40 20.43 2.14 1.63 76.39 
Zhejiang 0.83 5.43 9.59 0.83 1.15 81.47 
Anhui 2.43 14.17 22.66 2.43 1.26 85.79 
Fujian 1.28 9.22 23.57 1.28 0.79 79.95 
Jiangxi 2.50 16.21 35.08 2.50 0.93 78.45 
Shandong 4.27 30.40 30.38 4.27 2.02 82.50 
Henan 4.67 43.90 45.93 4.67 1.92 75.06 
Hubei 3.39 25.79 43.69 3.39 1.19 76.28 
Hunan 4.50 39.68 57.84 4.50 1.38 73.51 
Guangdong 2.78 21.33 19.10 2.78 2.26 74.89 
Guangxi 2.55 22.94 46.95 2.55 0.98 76.00 
Hainan 0.44 4.00 43.15 0.44 0.19 81.05 
Chongqing 1.30 11.92 38.75 1.30 0.62 74.24 
Sichuan 4.72 43.77 52.72 4.72 1.67 71.77 
Guizhou 1.60 15.97 44.61 1.60 0.72 87.72 
Yunnan 3.20 30.29 63.10 3.20 0.96 84.37 
Shaanxi 0.86 8.54 22.28 0.86 0.77 75.20 
Gansu 0.50 5.51 20.99 0.50 0.53 73.09 
Qinghai 0.09 0.83 13.83 0.09 0.12 78.66 
Ningxia 0.09 0.81 11.88 0.09 0.14 78.28 
Xinjiang 0.36 3.43 14.02 0.36 0.49 72.21 
EU 
Belgium 10.95 6.11 53.70 1.04 0.46 95.40 
Czechia 2.34 1.53 14.46 0.21 0.44 90.26 
Denmark 17.47 12.83 222.59 1.53 0.48 87.60 
Germany 57.87 27.58 33.36 5.46 4.53 94.27 
Estonia 0.52 0.29 21.95 0.04 0.06 80.87 
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Ireland 3.36 1.62 33.62 0.29 0.15 87.68 
Greece 1.36 0.74 6.92 0.08 0.28 59.79 
Spain 50.07 29.97 64.33 4.30 2.94 85.85 
France 23.40 13.35 19.95 2.18 2.05 93.03 
Italy 11.38 8.57 14.16 1.47 2.34 128.90 
Latvia 0.42 0.32 11.33 0.03 0.06 80.21 
Lithuania 0.77 0.61 31.50 0.06 0.12 79.17 
Luxembourg 0.15 0.09 15.25 0.01 0.01 83.55 
Hungary 4.76 2.87 29.32 0.43 0.00 91.38 
Netherlands 15.17 12.30 71.78 1.46 0.83 95.96 
Austria 5.15 2.82 32.06 0.51 0.49 98.05 
Poland 22.07 11.91 31.36 1.99 2.18 90.20 
Portugal 5.47 2.17 21.02 0.36 0.43 65.13 
Slovenia 0.25 0.26 12.45 0.05 0.07 89.17 
Slovakia 0.53 0.61 11.30 0.02 0.17 92.50 
Finland 1.96 1.11 20.12 0.18 0.17 91.43 
Sweden 2.58 1.38 13.74 0.24 0.30 93.06 





V Measuring Time-Varying Market Efficiency 
Authors: Yali Mu and Stephan von Cramon-Taubadel 
Abstract 
This paper proposes the idea for benchmarking time-varying market efficiency. Using time-
varying VECM coupled with stochastic frontier models, we benchmark speeds of restoring 
market efficiency for different periods. We use price data from 30 provincial pork markets in 
China from 2000 to 2017. The time-varying VECM results reveal that for the great majority of 
market pairs, between 20% and 40% of any deviation from the long-run equilibrium are corrected 
within one month. We find that the estimated individual speed of restoring market efficiency 
varies over space (provinces in China) and time (years). And the estimated frontiers for the speed 
of restoring market efficiency fall as distances increase between markets. We also find that the 
estimated frontier shifts down over periods. This reflects the effect of distance falls over periods. 
However the overall speeds of restoring market efficiency scatter with a downward trend. This 
suggests other factors such as government interventions, pig industry restructure under 
environmental pressure, trade delayed by traffic jams or food safety checks, might impede the 
speeds of price transmission in general. 
Keywords: market efficiency, time-varying VECM, state-space modeling, benchmark 
1 Introduction 
The basic benchmarking idea and procedure have been presented in Chapters III and IV. It 
generates some useful insights. The empirical applications are based on assumptions that the 
elasticities and adjustment parameters that describe pork price transmission between markets 
have been constant over the 2000-2017 sample period. However, China has experienced rapid 
economic growth and restructuring over this period, transportation and communication networks 
have gone from the third world to the first world, which has led to regional pork supply and 
demand shifts during the period.  
Consequently, the elasticities and adjustment parameters estimated and analysed for measuring 
market efficiency in the previous chapters may have changed over the sample period. In this 
chapter, we divide the whole sample period into four sub-periods and focus on evaluating price 
transmission and market efficiency by loosening one of those assumptions (i.e. the adjustment 
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parameters change over time) and exploring the implications. So we have two important 
objectives, (i) generating time-varying error correction parameters by following (Adämmer and 
Bohl, 2015, 2018) to estimate time-varying VECMs and (ii) incorporating frontier techniques for 
different periods to study how the market efficiency frontiers have shifted over time.  
The state space estimation of VECM has been used to analyze price discovery (Silverio and Szklo, 
2012; Caporale et al., 2014; Adämmer and Bohl, 2015, 2018; Vollmer et al., 2020). Estimates of price 
transmission using time-varying VECM under state-space form make it appealing to investigate 
whether the contributions of markets to price transmission shift over time (Adämmer and Bohl, 
2018; Vollmer et al., 2020). 
As China is the biggest pork producer and consumer globally, our sample set (30 provinces) is 
suited for this benchmarking study with abundant observations. In addition, we apply a time-
varying VECM to overcome previous limitations of methods. It enables us to investigate the 
market integration process by quantifying the speeds of restoring market efficiency during the 
study period.  
For the rest of this article, section 2 outlines the methodology and the data. In section 3, we show 
empirical results. Second 4 discuss the results. Finally, section 5 ends with conclusions and 
limitations of this research. 
2 Methodology and data 
2.1 Unit root test 
We do Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin tests (KPSS, Kwiatkowski et al., 1992) to confirm 
the unit root of the price series. To detect potential structural breaks, we employ the Zivot and 
Andrews (1992) test of the null hypothesis of a unit root process against the alternative of a 
stationary process that allows for a break in both the level or/and the trend. The break date is 
selected where the t-statistic from the ADF test of unit root is at a most negative value.  
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2.2 Estimating time-varying market efficiency 
Following the bivariate VECM used in Chapter III, the long-run cointegrating relationship 
between prices is assumed to be time-invariant. We estimate time-varying VECM to get the 
short-run interactions between prices which vary over time. 
So we follow Adämmer and Bohl (2015; 2018) rewrite the model as: 
              
  
+   
      + ∑     
           
 
   + ∑    
  
         
 
   +                               (1a)          
             
  
+   
 
     + ∑    
  
         
 
   + ∑    
  
         
 
   +                                (1b)  
Where   notes the first difference of logarithmic pork prices in question.   is the lag order. The 
parameters    
  ,    
  
    
  
 and    
  
 in (1a) and (1b), measure the short-run dynamics of the system 
at each  .Time-varying adjustment parameters   
  and   
 
 measure the speed of restoring market 
efficiency after deviations from the long-run equilibrium at each   (i.e., how        and        
change in period   in response to any disequilibrium (       ) in the previous period    ). 
The error correction terms 
                                                                                                                         (2) 
capture the temporary deviations from the long-run equilibrium (              +              ). 
We normalize the long-run equilibrium relationship on the higher of the two prices so that       is 
expected to be less than or equal to 1, thus the adjustment parameters   
  are expected to be 
negative and   
 
 are expected to be positive in equations (1a) and (1b). 
To get time-varying speeds of adjustment parameters, we, therefore, reformulate the VECM in 
state-space form and apply the Kalman filter to estimate. Then the dynamic VECM measurement 
equation: 
                                              +                (3) 
Where, 
        |             
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Where      [
       
       
] is the vector of price differences on the LHS of equations (1a) and (1b)； 
    [
 
 
     
 
         
 





     
 
         
 
         
]  arrays the RHS variables in 
equations (1a) and (1b).    represents the vector of time-varying coefficients.  
The Kalman filter is a recursive algorithm that computes the optimal estimates of state variables 
for each observation  , conditional on the information set available up to time  . The filtering 
updates our knowledge of the system each time a new observation is brought in (Durbin and 
Koopman, 2012). The transition equation: 
                                                                           +                                                             (4) 
Where, 
     |           
∗  
  is the identity matrix with  ∗    +    dimension, which corresponds to dimensions of the 
column of    and the row of   . 
We estimate adjustment parameters   
  and   
 
 for a total of 435 unique pairs of pork markets in 
China at each observation time   from January 2000 to December 2017. We sum the estimated 
adjustment parameters   
  and   
 
 for all       to provide an estimate of the aggregate speeds of 
adjustment for each unique pair of markets at each period. Accounting for the expected signs of 
the estimated adjustment parameters,  
                                                                       
 
   
                                                             (5) 
the total speed of price transmission between markets   and  , which is expected to be larger than 
0 and less than 1, measures the total proportion of any disequilibrium that is corrected per  . 
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2.3 Stochastic frontier of time-varying market efficiency 
The result of our first stage generates of 93090 (       ) estimated adjustment coefficients 
      from 435 bivariate time-varying VECMs.
 1
 Since the data frequency is monthly, we generate 
adjustment parameters for each month  .  
In the second stage of our analysis, we first aggregate the estimated monthly adjustment 
parameters for each period  . 
                                                                 ∑      
    
                                                                 (6) 
The result is a panel of 1740 (     ) adjustment parameters      for four periods y = 2002-
2005, 2006-2009, 2010-2013 and 2014- 2017. 
Table 1: The Panel of estimated ∑       
  Period ( ) 
2002-2005 2006-2009 2010-2013 2014-2017 
No. Pair     
∑      
    
    
 ∑      
    
    
 ∑      
    
     
 ∑      
    
     
 
1 1↔2 ∑              ∑              ∑              ∑              
2 1↔3 ∑              ∑              ∑              ∑              
⁞ ⁞ ⁞ ⁞ ⁞ ⁞ 
29 1↔30 ∑               ∑               ∑               ∑               
30 2↔1 ∑              ∑              ∑              ∑              
⁞ ⁞ ⁞ ⁞ ⁞   
                                                             
1 As described in section 3 of Chapter III, in 385 of 435 cases (89%) the SBIC criterion selects the lag-length l=2, we choose 
lag=2 for all pairs, so the estimated       in time-varying VECM starts at the second month ( =2) and ends up at the month last 
second observation (     ) for each pair. We drop the first three-year unstable estimates of adjustment parameters for each 
pair. 
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435 29↔30 ∑                ∑              ∑                ∑                
Source: Own expression.  
We estimate stochastic frontiers for aggregated adjustment parameters     . We prefer stochastic 
frontier methods following the procedure proposed in Chapter III, the difference is we extend the 
estimation for four periods. And one limitation is that we do not account for the measurement 
errors of the aggregated     . Our dependent variable, the adjustment parameters       are 
estimated and are therefore subject to measurement error, which is explicitly accounted for in 
stochastic frontier specification in previous chapters. But in this chapter, we do not account for 
the standard errors of time-varying speeds of adjustment parameters.
 2
  
The frontier for the aggregated adjustment parameters     ,  
      (       )                                                         (7) 
Where     includes a vector of variables that are expected to influence the speeds of restoring 
market efficiency (     ), such as distance     and dummy     (the same variables used in 
Chapter III).       is inefficiency term and      is the statistical noise which captures the 
measurement errors. Unlike previous chapters, we do not include variables to explain the two 
error components      and      in equation (7). 
2.4 Data 
We estimate the bivariate VECMs and time-varying VECMs with logarithms of monthly pork 
prices of 30 provinces in China, documented in China Livestock and Veterinary Yearbook 
(Ministry of Agriculture of China, 2001-2018). The provincial monthly average data are 
aggregated from weekly retail prices collected in 470 markets nationwide. All of the pork price 
series start in January 2000 and end in December 2017. It is the same data set as used in Chapter 
III. In addition to the price series shown in Figure 1 of Chapter III, we present another three 
typical monthly pork price series chosen from the whole sample set of 30. We measure distance 
in 1000 km between province capitals. 
                                                             
2 We are facing a problem of calculating a complete set of standard error for estimated      . 




Figure 1: Three monthly pork prices series from Jan. 2000 to Dec. 2017 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture of China (2001-2018). 
3 Results 
KPSS stationarity tests reject the null of stationarity for all the 30 price series, confirming the 
ADF test results showed in Chapter III. The Zivot and Andrews (1992) tests also confirm the 
ADF test results by ruling out the alternative of a stationary series with a breakpoint on a 5% 
significance level (Table A.1 in appendix of this chapter). 
3
 
First step: We estimate 435 bivariate VECMs in state space form for all pairs. And then 
aggregate        to     . 
Figure 2 depicts the speeds of price transmission (       for two sample pairs at each observation 
  (June of each sample year). Overall the speed of price transmission between Beijing and 
Guangdong (sharing a distance of 2122 km) is lower than Jiangsu and Guangdong (with a 
distance of 1362 km), which indicates the deviation from the long-run equilibrium is corrected 
faster within one month for the pair Jiangsu and Guangdong than Beijing and Guangdong. 
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For the pair Beijing and Guangdong, the speeds of price transmission vary roughly between 0.2 
and 0.25, which indicates that Beijing and Guangdong, around 20% to 25% of the deviation from 
long-run equilibrium is corrected at June for each year. For the pair Jiangsu and Guangdong, the 
speed of price transmission varies roughly between 0.3 and 0.4 in the selected sample months, 
which indicates that at least 30% of any deviation from long-run equilibrium is corrected within 
one month, most of the time it is corrected by around 40%.  
The variations between 2003 and 2007 for Beijing-Guangdong and Jiangsu and Guangdong are 
striking. Perhaps pork markets are intervened to keep prices stable in some markets. 
Figure 2: Examples of time-varying ∑       
 
 
Source: Own estimations.  
 
Figure 3 presents the entire periodical average set of estimated speed of price transmission (     ). 
For the great majority of 435 market pairs over the four periods, between 20% and 40% of any 
deviation from the long-run equilibrium is corrected within one month.  Some high speeds of 
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Figure 3: Distribution of estimated speeds of price transmission (     ) in different periods  
 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics of       for four periods 
 
Period Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
2002-2005 0.364 0.196 0.01 1.00 
2006-2009 0.336 0.142 0.01 0.86 
2010-2013 0.291 0.119 0.01 0.69 
2014-2017 0.265 0.119 0.00 0.74 
 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics of estimated speeds of adjustment over four periods. 
According to these statistics, the average speeds of price transmission drop from 36.4% in the 
period 2002-2005 to 26.5% in the most recent period. It indicates that deviation from the long-run 
equilibrium is corrected slower within one month during the recent period compared to those in 
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Second step: Table 3 presents the estimation results of the frontier models for the speeds of 
restoring market efficiency (equation (7), the dependent variable     ) for different periods. 
According to these results, the frontier      falls by 0.055 per 1000 km of distance between two 
markets during 2002-2005, i.e. the proportion of a deviation from the long-run equilibrium that is 
corrected per month drops by 5.5% for each extensional 1000 km of distance. Over time, we see 
the effect of distance is falling down. The frontier      falls by 0.046 per 1000 km of distance 
between two markets during 2006-2009, 0.035 during 2010-2013 and 0.029 during the most 
recent period.  
Table 3: Estimated speed of restoring market efficiency frontier for four periods 
2002-2005 Coef. Std. Err t P-value 
    -0.055 0.012 -4.530 0.000 
    0.022 0.029 0.770 0.441 
Constant 0.450 0.076 5.950 0.000 
/lnsig2v -3.329 0.068 -49.070 0.000 
/lnsig2u -13.483 152.335 -0.090 0.929 
sigma_v 0.189 0.006 
  sigma_u 0.001 0.090 
  sigma2 0.036 0.002 
  lambda 0.006 0.090 
  2006-2009 Coef. Std. Err t P-value 
    -0.046 0.009 -5.210 0.000 
    -0.002 0.021 -0.080 0.939 
Constant 0.411 0.053 7.730 0.000 
/lnsig2v -3.982 0.068 -58.660 0.000 
/lnsig2u -13.251 95.154 -0.140 0.889 
sigma_v 0.137 0.005 
  sigma_u 0.001 0.063 
  sigma2 0.019 0.001 
  lambda 0.010 0.063 
  2010-2013 Coef. Std. Err t P-value 
    -0.035 0.008 -4.610 0.000 
    -0.030 0.018 -1.680 0.093 
Constant 0.352 0.053 6.660 0.000 
/lnsig2v -4.301 0.068 -63.210 0.000 
/lnsig2u -12.827 77.613 -0.170 0.869 
sigma_v 0.116 0.004 
  sigma_u 0.002 0.064 
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sigma2 0.014 0.001 
  lambda 0.014 0.064 
  2014-2017 Coef. Std. Err t P-value 
    -0.029 0.007 -3.920 0.000 
    -0.054 0.018 -3.070 0.002 
Constant 0.321 0.063 5.130 0.000 
/lnsig2v -4.305 0.068 -63.230 0.000 
/lnsig2u -13.023 102.779 -0.130 0.899 
sigma_v 0.116 0.004 
  sigma_u 0.001 0.076 
  sigma2 0.014 0.001 
  lambda 0.013 0.077 
  Source: Own estimations. 
Sharing a common border has no significant effect in the first two periods, but has unexpected 
negative effect in the last two periods. 
Figure 4 sketches the 1740 estimates of       against distance, as well as the estimated frontier 
based on the results in Table 3. It highlights the fact that while the estimated effect of distance on 
the speed of restoring market efficiency is significant, the magnitude decreases over periods. 
Improved infrastructure might lead to a decline in distance effects over time. However, the 
overall      shifts down over periods, this indicates other factors might also play a role. 
We have to admit several limitations for the estimation results showed here. First, we do not 
account for the standard errors for estimated       which makes us lose the advantage of using 
frontier estimation. Second, LR test of sigma_u=0 cannot be rejected, so we do not find 
inefficiency from these estimations. Third, we only use one variable to explain     , so the 
frontiers are simply illustrated on Figure 4 as we estimate.
 
 The insights generated from this part 

































































Table 4 presents the summary statistics of predicted frontier of the speed of restoring 
market efficiency for four periods. For all the periods, the minimum values are almost the 
same around 0.2. It drops around 0.03 per period. 
Table 4: Summary of predicted frontier of       for four periods 
 
Period Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
2002-2005 0.364 0.051 0.207 0.465 
2006-2009 0.337 0.039 0.209 0.403 
2010-2013 0.292 0.026 0.200 0.341 
2014-2017 0.266 0.023 0.192 0.312 
 
Distance accounts for variable trade costs related to shipping agricultural commodities 
between spatially separated markets, we see that distance plays a major role in earlier 
periods, probably because the provinces are primarily linked via physical pork trade 
flows. Over time. P  p  ‘s diet shifts, pork is not the predominant protein source for 
people especially those are in capital cities. So price transmission between provinces is 
mainly guided by information flows, then distance would play a relatively minor role in 
correcting disequilibrium since there are information costs which could not be accounted 
for by distance.   
Definitely distance is one of the most important factors. For markets sharing a shorter 
distance (within 1500 km), the frontier shifts down with a large magnitude; for markets 
which are far apart (over 3500 km), the frontier drops in a relatively lower magnitude. 
We find distance effects fall over time. Since we have not accounted for the standard 
errors in the estimation, it is not highly comparable to the results of Chapter III. 
Aggregating the average estimates of        for different periods is rough and gives rise to 
information loss on month-to-month or year-to-year changes within those complete 
periods. 
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The main innovation of this paper is to consider time-varying parameters, however there 
are many specific questions waiting for us to answer. What are the roles of regional 
dummies in chapter III; can we confirm the overall pattern of efficiency across provinces? 
Have some province been improving their efficiency compared with other provinces over 
time?  
It is true there is no equivalent theoretical foundation for deriving a frontier for speeds of 
price transmission. This study implies that other factors influence the speeds of restoring 
market efficiency than merely the level of proximity. Trade dependency, market 
infrastructure, roads quality, market information could also have effects. Factors such as 
dramatic changes in diesel fuel prices over the study period, delayed transport time due to 
traffic jams lead by increasing numbers of vehicles on the way for shipping, more strict 
food safety control, local preference consumption by substituting pork with other meat 
(e.g. beef, lamb), deserve to be analyzed and geared towards generating insights into our 
research question.  
5 Conclusion and limitations 
We benchmark speeds of restoring market efficiency using time-varying VECM 
estimations coupled with frontier estimations for different periods. The use of frontier 
methods for different periods allows us to estimate benchmarks for the speed of restoring 
market efficiency by considering time effects and market specific effects.  
Several limitations should be pointed out and addressed in future research. First, we 
could extend to benchmark speeds of restoring market efficiency using time-varying 
VECM estimations coupled with panel frontier estimations instead of frontier estimation 
for different periods. By aggregating the estimated monthly speeds of adjustment to 
periodical ones, we lose some of the advantage of time varying parameters. If a critical 
break/shock occurred in an unpredictable month of a year, this aggregation means that the 
effect is averaged out or smoothed. Data on further explaining speeds of restoring market 
efficiency are available with annual frequency.  
Second, in this application, we did not incorporate information on the standard errors of 
our estimates       into the frontier estimation as we did in Chapter III. We have some 
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information on the standard error of each observation of the dependent variable from the 
first stage VECM estimation in Chapter III. So we know that some of       are estimated 
with more precision than others, and it would make sense to use the information of time-
varying VECM estimates to improve the frontier estimation for this chapter (i.e.       
with smaller standard errors are more reliable, and we should give them relatively greater 
weights in the estimation of the location and shape of the frontier). And it would be 
useful to have standard errors for the aggregated speeds of adjustment, to see how 
reliable the estimates are and whether trends that we see in Figure 4 are significant.  
In addition, we do not deal with spatial correlation (if moving from A to C means going 
through B, then the efficiency of AC will depend on AB and BC) in this application. If 
trade is going on by passing through B on the shortest route from A to C, then the 
efficiency of transmission between A and C will depend on the efficiencies between A 
and B, and B and C. For example, we have Anhui province, Jiangsu province and 
Shanghai, if we transport pork from Anhui province to Shanghai, we must go through 
Nanjing bridge (Jiangsu) because the Yangtze River divided this southeast part to north 
and south. So the efficiency of price transmission between Anhui and Shanghai will 
depend on the efficiency between Anhui and Jiangsu and Jiangsu and Shanghai. 
Finally, we follow Adämmer and Bohl (2015, 2018) that assume the long-run 
cointegration relationship between prices is constant and this relationship is disturbed by 
transient shocks. The time-varying VECM that we estimate enables us to have short-run 
interactions between prices in question vary over time. However, the assumption of a 
time-invariant long-run relationship might be not plausible for heterogeneous agricultural 
commodities, and the relationship between prices in different markets probably is subject 
to shocks that could lead to persistent changes in price relationship (Vollmer et al., 2020). 
For example, the relative availabilities of different pork carcass weights on producing 
markets could vary over years due to farmland restructuring, animal disease, etc. The 
resulting changes in quantity could influence the relationship between import prices and 
export prices. Changes in commodity prices also spur the reallocation of resources in the 
agricultural producing sector in response to changing demand patterns. Changes in trade 
direction and partners could have similar influence. Investments in infrastructure, 
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changes in interruptions during trade, could lead to changes in the basis between a 
delivery market specified in the destination market. Further research would loosen the 
assumption of a constant and linear long-run relationship between pork markets in our 
research question, and then account for variation in the error correction terms that correct 
any deviations from the long-run relationship. 
The old saw, ―much remains to be done,‖ is relevant here (Fama, 1970). In our case, the 
future endeavor is to look for factors that determine the dynamic market efficiency 
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Appendix of Chapter V 
Table A1: KPSS test results 
  Test statistics    Test statistics 
Price level Lags constant Constant&trend Δ price level Lags constant Constant&trend 
Beijing 2 6.102 0.293 ΔB  j    1 0.046 0.033 
Tianjin 1 9.099 0.436 ΔT   j   1 0.045 0.026 
Hebei 4 3.639 0.262 ΔH     3 0.049 0.029 
Shanxi 3 4.526 0.352 ΔS      2 0.050 0.025 
Inner Mongolia 2 6.246 0.465 ΔI     M        1 0.061 0.037 
Liaoning 4 3.722 0.302 ΔL        3 0.054 0.026 
Jilin 4 3.706 0.235 ΔJ     3 0.047 0.024 
Heilongjiang 3 4.601 0.326 ΔH      j     2 0.053 0.024 
Shanghai 2 6.227 0.485 ΔS        1 0.053 0.051 
Jiangsu 3 4.618 0.280 ΔJ       2 0.047 0.047 
Zhejiang 2 6.345 0.428 ΔZ  j     1 0.059 0.050 
Anhui 2 6.094 0.440 Δ      1 0.051 0.036 
Fujian 2 6.176 0.266 ΔF j    1 0.053 0.052 
Jiangxi 2 6.217 0.459 ΔJ       1 0.056 0.045 
Shandong 4 3.776 0.240 ΔS        3 0.042 0.028 
Henan 2 6.089 0.451 ΔH     1 0.061 0.049 
Hubei 3 4.650 0.378 ΔH     2 0.054 0.039 
Hunan 3 4.633 0.378 ΔH     2 0.057 0.040 
Guangdong 2 6.095 0.385 ΔG         2 0.057 0.058 
Guangxi 3 4.503 0.423 ΔG       2 0.061 0.047 
Hainan 1 9.724 0.340 ΔH      1 0.073 0.066 
Chongqing 2 6.100 0.425 Δ          1 0.047 0.039 
Sichuan 3 4.763 0.437 ΔS       2 0.057 0.040 
Guizhou 3 4.905 0.371 ΔG  z    2 0.063 0.043 
Yunnan 2 6.481 0.399 ΔY      1 0.096 0.093 
Shaanxi 2 6.224 0.456 ΔS       1 0.048 0.029 
Gansu 2 6.265 0.457 ΔG     1 0.052 0.039 
Qinghai 1 9.246 0.771 ΔQ       1 0.052 0.035 
Ningxia 1 9.341 0.930 ΔN       2 0.043 0.028 
Xinjiang 2 6.283 0.323 ΔX  j     1 0.138 0.042 
Note: a) Number of lags is chosen by SBIC criterion. c) KPSS test with constant: 0.74 (1 %), 0.46 (5 %), 0.35 (10 %); 
KPSS test with constant and trend: 0.22 (1 %), 0.15 (5 %), 0.12 (10 %). 
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Table A2: Zivot and Andrews test results 
 Test statistics Test statistics Test statistics 
Price level lag Intercept  Month trend Month both Month 
Beijing 2 -4.26 2007.04 -3.54 2011.09 -4.25 2007.04 
Tianjin 1 -4.19 2007.04 -3.24 2011.07 -4.19 2007.04 
Hebei 4 -3.95 2007.04 -3.15 2011.06 -4.03 2007.04 
Shanxi 3 -4.24 2007.03 -3.58 2011.06 -4.40 2007.04 
Inner Mongolia 2 -4.95 2007.04 -3.63 2011.07 -5.03 2007.04 
Liaoning 4 -4.28 2007.04 -3.15 2011.06 -4.37 2007.04 
Jilin 4 -4.51 2007.04 -3.28 2011.06 -4.51 2007.04 
Heilongjiang 3 -4.67 2007.03 -3.81 2011.06 -4.78 2007.03 
Shanghai 2 -4.43 2007.05 -3.57 2011.06 -4.67 2007.05 
Jiangsu 3 -4.10 2007.04 -3.37 2008.01 -4.20 2007.04 
Zhejiang 2 -4.31 2007.03 -3.50 2007.12 -4.49 2007.03 
Anhui 2 -4.54 2007.03 -3.83 2011.06 -4.70 2007.03 
Fujian 2 -4.02 2006.07 -3.37 2008.02 -4.01 2006.07 
Jiangxi 2 -4.35 2007.04 -3.53 2011.06 -4.54 2007.04 
Shandong 4 -4.36 2007.03 -3.19 2011.06 -4.40 2007.03 
Henan 2 -4.13 2007.03 -3.39 2011.06 -4.30 2007.03 
Hubei 3 -3.95 2007.04 -3.23 2011.06 -4.17 2007.04 
Hunan 3 -3.89 2006.06 -3.31 2007.12 -4.01 2006.11 
Guangdong 2 -3.89 2006.11 -3.22 2008.02 -4.01 2007.05 
Guangxi 3 -3.63 2006.07 -3.10 2007.12 -3.94 2007.04 
Hainan 1 -3.92 2007.04 -3.32 2011.10 -3.81 2007.04 
Chongqing 2 -4.97 2007.03 -3.91 2011.07 -5.01 2007.03 
Sichuan 3 -4.53 2007.04 -3.55 2011.06 -4.84 2007.05 
Guizhou 3 -4.26 2007.04 -3.33 2011.07 -4.40 2007.04 
Yunnan 2 -4.17 2006.11 -3.24 2011.07 -4.16 2007.04 
Shaanxi 2 -4.63 2007.03 -4.15 2011.07 -4.88 2007.03 
Gansu 2 -5.11
 
2007.03 -3.54 2011.06 -5.11 2007.03 
Qinghai 1 -4.42 2007.04 -3.45 2011.04 -4.61 2007.04 
Ningxia 1 -4.77 2006.10 -4.03 2011.06 -5.17 2007.04 
Xinjiang 2 -4.02 2007.05 -3.46 2012.09 -4.04 2011.03 
Note: H0: I(1) against H1: I(0) with max.1 potential breakpoint (Month) in intercept and/or trend. Lags selected 
according to BIC. Critical values with max.1 potential breakpoint in intercept: 0.01= -5.34, 0.05= -4.8, 0.1= -4.58; in 





VI General Conclusion 
1 Summary of results 
The main objective of this dissertation is to propose a new method for benchmarking dynamic 
market efficiency and implement the proposed procedure to pork markets and hog markets to 
have a better understanding of spatial market efficiency in China and the EU as well. The 
application is constituted by pork markets in China during the period 2000-2017, hog markets in 
the EU at the international level and China at the interprovincial level in the years 2004-2017.   
This study first review the testing work of the Law of One Price and find mixed and controversial 
              p          p                 M                  pp                     ―L  ‖  
amongst them, trade costs, trade delay and policy measures play essential roles. So instead of 
testing the LOP, a                                              p              G      ‘  (1975) 
model. Trade cost is a function of distance between two markets. And the theoretical long-run 
elasticity of price transmission for each market pair is calculated as the cost share of agricultural 
commodity in the lower-price market   in the price of the commodity in the higher-price market  . 
In the first empirical article (Chapter III)  ―Estimating dynamic market efficiency frontiers‖     
empirical application is illustrated to the example of pork markets in China. The estimated 
frontier of the magnitude of market efficiency of Chinese pork markets lies just slightly below the 
theoretical frontier based on transport costs. This provides some support for the validity of the 
estimated frontier and suggests that transport accounts for most of the total costs of pork trade 
between provinces in China. And the estimated frontier differs considerably from the OLS 
estimate of price transmission elasticity on distance that has been used in past studies. However, 
there is no equivalent theoretical foundation for deriving a frontier for the speed of price 
transmission since it depends on a complex set of logistic factors such as transport capacities and 
speeds, and the time it takes to initiate and execute transactions. 
This analysis provides a convenient way of accounting for sampling error in estimated measures 
of price transmission. The estimated standard errors of both magnitude and speed of market 
efficiency from the first step have a significant positive influence on the variance of random error 
of their frontier estimations. We also find that the estimated inefficiency from the frontier of the 




the speed of restoring market efficiency, this indicates that unobserved factors that reduce the 
magnitude of market efficiency also reduce the speed of restoring market efficiency.  
Significant province effects are found, market pairs involving provinces located in the Northeast 
of China are characterized by the highest magnitude of market efficiency, and that the magnitude 
of market efficiency tends to be lower for provinces located farther to the South and West. 
Factors such as ethnicity and dietary customs, relative remoteness might contribute to these 
results.  
The second article (Chapter IV)  ―Comparing market efficiency frontiers‖           p          
benchmarking market efficiency method proposed in Chapter III by extending applications to 
international hog markets within the EU and interprovincial markets in China from the year 2004 
   2017  S                                                   ‗     p       ‘                  
estimated price transmission elasticities for both China and the EU. 
The results show that for most market pairs the estimated elasticity of price transmission is below 
      p                                         ‗            ‘              p                        
LOP on both Chinese hog markets and the EU hog markets. The results suggest that the 
magnitudes of market efficiency are characterized by higher heterogeneity in the EU than the 
Chinese ones. 
Significant provincial effects (China) and member-state effects (EU) in market efficiency are 
found. Provinces located in the northeast or central China (e.g. Liaoning and Henan) are 
characterized by higher magnitude of market efficiency, while the very southern and western (e.g. 
Guangdong, Fujian and Gansu) parts tend to have relatively lower efficiency. For the EU, 
member states such as Hungary, Czech Republic and Austria located in the central are with 
higher magnitude of market efficiency. Member states located farther to the North (e.g. Sweden, 
UK) or South (e.g. Greece) tend to be less efficient. 
Furthermore, comparing the two benchmarks, results show that the empirical frontier for the EU 
lies below the one for China. For most market pairs in the EU, the distance (within 0.1) to the 
frontier is farther than China (within 0.05). The estimated average inefficiency is 8% for China 




result may imply higher transport costs and more stringent animal welfare-based restrictions on 
transporting live hogs in the EU. 
The third article (Chapter V) ―Measuring time-varying market efficiency‖  p  p         
benchmarking time-varying market efficiency. Using time-varying VECM coupled with 
stochastic frontier models for different periods, we benchmark speeds of restoring market 
efficiency during the study period 2000-2017. The time-varying VECM results reveal that for the 
great majority of market pairs, between 20% and 40% of any deviation from the long-run 
equilibrium are corrected within one month. We find that the estimated individual speed of 
restoring market efficiency vary over space (provinces in China) and time (periods). And the 
estimated frontiers for the speed of restoring market efficiency fall as distances increase between 
markets. We also find that the estimated frontier shifts down over periods. 
2 Future research outlook 
Several aspects deserve further investigation based on this research progress and results: 
Extension of the used price data, trade flow data and transport cost data 
The analyses suffer from data limitations to some degree. Whereas in this dissertation monthly 
price data are used, weekly or daily data would help to get more observations, to lose less 
information through timely aggregation. Especially in the second empirical article, dealing with 
hog prices for China and the EU, weekly hog prices had to be aggregated for the EU to monthly 
prices because only monthly hog prices for China are available. These pig meat carcass prices are 
also very heterogeneous across space, because they vary in lean meat percentage, carcass size, etc. 
Based on this experience, I started to collect daily price data by retrieving price data through web 
to tackle some limitations of currently used data sources. 
In addition, in the application to hog markets in the EU, the data for transport costs between the 
EU member states are not collected, part of trade cost associated with animal welfare regulations 
during transport in the EU which need to be specified more carefully.  
Meta frontier 
Though hog market efficiency frontiers are estimated for both China and the EU, only the 




method that proposed would be extended using meta-frontier techniques (Battese et al., 2004; 
O‘D               2008)       p           -country benchmarks and thus investigate whether 
there are indications that markets in some countries are systematically more or less efficient than 
markets in others.  
Benchmark vertical market efficiency frontiers 
Benchmark market efficiency frontiers in a vertical setting rather than a spatial setting would be 
another novelty. Piglet-pig and pig-pork stages in the chain would both be possible for vertical 
estimates. If data are available on the costs of pig production (the share of piglet costs in total 
costs) and the costs of pork production (the share of slaughter pigs in total costs), which would be 
theoretical cost share (Gardner, 1975) for the two stages in the chain. We could also estimate the 
level of the vertical price transmission elasticities against market-specific covariates that might be 
expected to influence it. The costs shares might vary across regions and there are also 
quantifiable differences in the market structure in the different regions (e.g. market power) and 
market arrangements with the producers (contracts, spot markets, etc.) that could lead to 
differences in the amount of competition, which would influence the vertical prices transmission 
(McCorriston et al., 1998; Weldegebriel, 2004). Thus, there would be a benchmark from the 
Gardner (1975) model. Some vertical price transmission elasticities are higher and closer to the 
theoretical cost share level, and some are lower and farther away.  
African Swine Fever and Coronavirus 2019 impact on Chinese and the EU pig industry 
The outbreak of African Swine Fever (ASF, 2018) has infected pigs, and coronavirus 2019 
(COVID-19) that is affecting humans and imaginably pigs as well and has had major economic 
impacts (Laborde et al., 2020). Each of them represents a path-breaking opportunity for 
researchers to incorporate effects into the market analysis. The implications of ASF on domestic 
pork market and global pork market are not extensively explored (Mason-D‘   z         2020). 
To investigate major structural breaks on pork/hog markets due to the ASF outbreak in 2018 and 
COVID-19 in China, in the EU as well, empirical applications would be carried out by adding 
hog price data from 2018 onward.  
Mason-D‘   z        (2020)   e equilibrium models to compare the state of system before the 




found the production shock in Chinese pig production tends to increase global food expenditures. 
Ramsey et al. (2021) characterize US beef, pork, and poultry price series behavior and dynamic 
linkages of these meat prices before COVID-19 and then compare these meat price movements 
under COVID-19 to model predictions. They found a resilient U.S. livestock sector. 
Both of them tell us little about the dynamic path that the market takes between equilibrium states 
and how long it takes to adjust back to the equilibrium after the shock. As time passes and more 
available price data during and after ASF and COVID-19 show up, we could test for the 
structural changes in the pork/hog price series and extend nonlinear models such as smooth 
transition models (Teräsvirta, 1994), Bayesian error correction and threshold models developed 
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